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1. WHAT ARE THE MAIN PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED? 
1.1. The need for solidarity supporting the implementation of EU standards  
The development of common policies on asylum, migration and management of the external 
borders of the Union has sought to address a series of global problems: 
• persisting economic differences between the EU and other parts of the world and 
continuing instability or lack of democracy in many third countries. The Union – especially 
after the formation of the internal market and the single currency – has the opportunity of 
sustaining economic growth and the progressive improvement in real living standards. This 
juxtaposition of circumstances is likely to lead to increasing migratory pressure on the 
European Union; 
• a continuous if not growing trend in illegal immigration towards the EU, involving 
transnational criminal networks operating for profit with complete disregard for human 
dignity and the safety of the lives of their victims; 
• demographic trends within the Union, and in particular an ageing population, which 
could lead to a decline in the EU’s work force, threatening economic growth, living 
standards and the maintenance of a high level of social protection. Part of the response to 
these trends has been to reconsider immigration policies across Member States and to open 
specific ‘labour migration’ channels so as to ensure the potential contribution of migrants 
to the EU’s work force and to sustaining growth; 
• the integration of the increasing number of third-country nationals living and working in 
the EU, which needs to be actively promoted. 
The recent enlargement has increased the challenge in maintaining and enhancing the 
security of our borders and finding a common response to the above global problems. Further 
enlargement will again increase the stakes. 
It is widely recognised that the challenges posed by the management of migration flows can 
no longer be met adequately by Member States acting alone and independently. In fact, over 
the past years the European Union has increased its role in developing a coordinated policy 
with regard to asylum, immigration and external border controls. Comprehensive and 
coordinated progress has been made on the basis of the programme on the area of freedom, 
security and justice, agreed by the European Council at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 
and 16 October 1999. The Hague Programme adopted by the European Council on 4 and 5 
November 2004, will build on the achievements. Its objective is to improve the common 
capability of the Union and its Member States inter alia to provide protection in accordance 
with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other international treaties to persons in need, 
to regulate migration flows and to control the external borders of the Union. The European 
Council considers that the common project of strengthening the area of freedom, security and 
justice is vital to securing safe communities, mutual trust and the rule of law throughout the 
Union. 
Free movement of persons within the Union is one of the four fundamental freedoms at the 
heart of the Single Market. Despite the absence of internal controls, not every third country 
national legally residing in the territory of the Member States has the right to reside in another 
Member State. Some third country nationals have the right, but its exercise is subject to 
certain conditions.  
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The abolition of controls has put a premium on ensuring that effective controls are in place 
along the external borders of the EU to prevent illegal entry so far as possible, the more so 
given the common objective that everyone living in the EU should be able to do so freely and 
securely and to enjoy full respect for their basic human rights. Member States are responsible 
for the implementation of the common standards in the area of external borders. Effective 
external border controls by Member States, therefore, are an important part of establishing an 
area of freedom, security and justice for all in the EU, which implies the need for common 
standards to be applied in this respect across all Member States where people enter into the 
EU.  
Who has the right of free movement under Community law? 
According to Community law the following persons enjoy the right of free movement: 
• Union citizens within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Treaty (EU nationals) and third country nationals 
who are members of the family of a Union citizen exercising his or her right to free movement, as referred 
to in Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;  
• Third country nationals and their family members, whatever their nationality, who, under agreements 
between the Community and its Member States, on the one hand, and these countries on the other, enjoy 
rights of free movement equivalent to those of citizens of the Union. This includes the countries party to the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area and the Swiss Confederation.  
The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere, acknowledged the need for harmonisation of national 
legislation on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals. In particular, it stated that 
the EU should ensure fair treatment of third country nationals residing lawfully on the territory of Member States 
and that a more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to 
those of EU citizens.  
Under the common immigration policy developed since this special meeting, of other third country nationals, so 
far only long term residents have been granted the right to reside in another Member State by Community law. 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 lays down the conditions for acquiring this right. The 
Council Directives on the right to family reunification (Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003), 
study (Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004) and research do not provide for the right to reside 
in another Member State, although in the latter two provisions are made to facilitate the mobility of students and 
researchers within the Community for the purpose of the pursuit of studies or research.  
By the same token, common standards need to be applied to those seeking asylum in Member 
States. Such standards will contribute to reducing secondary movements as a result of policy 
divergences between Member States. In an EU in which a claim is examined only in one 
Member State, applications shall be examined on the basis of common principles and 
decisions are taken on the basis of a common definition of persons in need of international 
protection. Just as there is a common EU interest in ensuring effective border controls, 
therefore, so too there is in maintaining a fair and effective implementation of the common 
European asylum system across Member States. Given the objective of securing continued 
respect for human rights across the EU, this common interest extends to making sure that the 
basic rights of such people are not infringed, that their application for asylum is properly dealt 
with and that they are treated with dignity. 
There is equally a common EU interest, both to provide support for border controls and to 
reinforce the effective implementation of legislation in the field of asylum and immigration, 
in ensuring that those who are staying in the EU illegally are obliged to leave and, if 
necessary, returned to the country from which they came as efficiently and speedily as 
possible. Again, the basic rights of such people need to be respected in the process of their 
return.  
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This common interest extends to the integration of migrants who are legally staying in the 
EU. Non-integration means that the contribution of migrants to society as a whole is less than 
it could be. The failure of one individual Member State in integrating third-country nationals 
can have adverse implications for other Member States and the European Union and it is 
therefore in the interest of all Member States to pursue effective integration strategies. 
The pursuit of this common interest in each of these related areas requires a common policy at 
EU level that is adequately implemented in all Member States. The main problem to be 
addressed, therefore, is how to put into effect this common policy so that it has the greatest 
chance of success. At the same time, there is a parallel need to ensure that the differential 
burden imposed on individual Member States, which bear a disproportionate part of the 
responsibility for policy in this general area – most especially in respect of the control of 
external borders because of their geographical location – is shared more equitably across 
Member States as a whole.  
In practice, such burden sharing is not only necessary to demonstrate solidarity between 
Member States in meeting their common interest but is likely to provide part of the response 
to the challenge of establishing effective means of pursuing EU objectives in the different 
areas of policy concerned. 
To support these policies, the Constitutional Treaty enshrines the principle of solidarity, 
including sharing of financial responsibility. Making financial responsibility sharing work in 
an enlarged Union is in itself an important challenge. Properly put into practice, financial 
responsibility sharing will become a powerful message about solidarity in an enlarged Union, 
and will contribute to the emerging sense of a shared European public order. 
The main problem to be addressed could therefore be defined as follows: 
How to implement the principle of solidarity in managing people flows by ensuring a fair 
share of responsibilities between Member States as concerns the burden arising from the 
implementation of common policies on asylum and immigration and on the management of 
the external borders? 
1.2 External borders: how to develop a common integrated border management  
The development of a common policy for the management of external borders has as its 
pillars a common corpus of legislation (the Schengen acquis)
1
; coordination and cooperation 
between Member States together with a common integrated risk analysis, staff trained in the 
European dimension and interoperational equipment under the aegis of the ‘European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union
2
 (hereafter ‘FRONTEX Agency’) and the principle of burden-sharing. 
The policy aims at ‘a common integrated border management system’ ensuring a uniform and 
                                                 
1
 The Commission brought forward a proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Community Code 
on the rules governing the movements of persons across borders last year (COM (2004) 391 final, 
26.5.2004). The objective of this proposal, going beyond the recast the Common Manual on checks at 
external borders (OJ C313 16.12.2002 p. 97), is to seek to establish a genuine Community Code on the 
rules governing the movement of persons across borders, with one part on external borders and one part 
on internal borders. The proposal is to be followed up by a practical handbook for border guards. 
2
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004, OJ L 349/1 
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high level of control and surveillance, as the necessary corollary to the free movement of 
persons within the EU.  
The following particular challenges in the management of external borders must be addressed. 
Ensuring that controls on external borders are as effective as possible in preventing illegal 
entry is a precondition for the abolition of internal borders within the Schengen. Once 
someone has entered the EU at a particular point he or she can then move virtually without 
restriction to other Member States, irrespective of his/her right to reside elsewhere in the EU. 
In consequence, every Member State in the Schengen area has an interest in the effectiveness 
with which others control the external borders for which they are responsible, since they stand 
to be adversely affected through an unwanted influx of illegal migrants if this task is 
performed inefficiently. There is, therefore, a compelling argument for the adoption of 
common provisions at EC level in this regard and for establishing some means of ensuring the 
effective application of these standards, despite the fact that the ultimate responsibility 
remains with the Member States concerned. This need is explicitly recognised in the 
Schengen Convention, which lays down common rules on entry of third-country nationals 
into the EU. As a consequence, Member States with external borders have had to adapt their 
border checks and surveillance to the standards and procedures decided at EU level and will 
continue to have to do so in coming years. 
Comparatively few Member States have land and/or sea borders of any length or geopolitical 
importance which require close and detailed surveillance - these bear the brunt of the 
responsibility for controlling illegal immigration and for safeguarding internal security by 
controlling the crossing of external borders for the whole of the EU. They also as a result bear 
a disproportionate share of the costs involved not only in preventing illegal entry but equally 
importantly of enabling those who are authorised to do so to enter without undue delay or 
inconvenience.  
Where does the burden for the control of external borders lie in the EU 25?  
Since the enlargement in 2004 the Member States are responsible for controlling 6.000 km of land border and 
85.000 km of coastline. With Norway and Iceland, with whom the internal borders have been lifted on 25 March 
2001, the total size of the external borders amounts to 7.000 km of land border and 72.000 of coastline.  
Once the new Member States become part of the Schengen area and borders between them and the EU-15 
countries and Norway and Iceland are removed and assuming that Switzerland also becomes part of the 
Schengen area, only 12 of the 25 Member States will have land borders with third countries. Moreover, for four 
of these (ES, FR, AT and SK), the borders will be less than 100 km. For a further two (EE and LV), the border 
will be under 400 km long (294 and 356 km, respectively), although here must be taken into account that 
controlling these borders with Russia may be demanding of two such relatively small countries (with only 1,6 – 
2,5 million inhabitants). Just 6 Member States (EL, FI, LT, PL, HU and SI) will have land borders with third 
countries longer than this (from 670 up to just over 1.300 km). The burden of patrolling the external EU land 
border will, therefore, fall mainly on these latter six countries and, to a lesser extent, on EE and LV.  
Six Member States have relatively long maritime borders with third countries in the Mediterranean and South-
West Atlantic (ES, FR, IT, GR, CY and to a lesser extent, MT), representing more than 32.000 km of coastline; 
four others (FI, EE, LT and PL) have relatively short maritime borders with Russia. (Although four other 
countries (PT, FR, UK and IE, the last two of which are not at present full members of the Schengen Area) also 
have long sea coasts, these border the Atlantic or the North Sea and the nearest countries are some distance 
away.) The burden of patrolling the EU’s maritime border will, therefore, fall largely on the former 6 Member 
States.  
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Air borders: at present, a few major international airports (Frankfurt M., Paris-CDG, Amsterdam, Madrid, Milan, 
Munich, Copenhagen and Vienna) are responsible for most of the flights arriving in the Schengen area from third 
countries. 
See Tables 1 -3 in the Annex  
The costs to ensure effective border control are dependent upon a number of factors inter alia:  
– the existence and the length of external borders; the number of crossing points; 
– the type of border (sea, land, air)) and the geo-physical conditions (whether, for example, it 
is mountainous or flat, there are cold or less cold waters, rocky or sandy coast line etc.) and 
the geo-political situation (which are the neighbouring countries and what is the situation 
there); 
– the volume of traffic and the scale of migratory pressure 
– the trafficking routes and the impact this has on the scale of the migratory pressure  
Member States with long external borders, or borders which are difficult to patrol, with a 
large number of people entering and leaving and/or with a high risk of illegal crossing, are 
likely to bear a heavy financial cost for ensuring that EU rules and standards are satisfied in 
this respect. As a result, these comparatively few Member States are making it possible for the 
whole EU to benefit from an area where the, free movement of persons is ensured. While they 
bear most of the costs of safeguarding this area, others are making big budgetary savings as 
controls at their borders are dismantled. 
Accordingly, there is a need for promoting solidarity between Member States to avoid placing 
a disproportionate burden on some countries and to ensure that the necessary resources are 
allocated to implementing the common standards. The need is especially acute since many of 
the countries on which the burden is heaviest have relatively low levels of GDP per head and, 
therefore, lack the resources to devote as much expenditure to this function as other Member 
States might wish.  
In addition, in an area without internal borders, persons holding a visa or residence permit 
from a Member State can move freely to other Schengen countries. Therefore, Member States 
are issuing visas not only in their own interest but also concerning the stay in other Member 
States. There is a common interest that all the visas are issued under common standards so to 
ensure that the beneficiaries are bona fide travellers and do not impose an unnecessary 
additional burden on the external borders controls of other Member States at the time of their 
arrival at the borders of the EU. 
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How much do Member States pay to secure the external borders?  
The Conclusions of the Seville European Council meeting called on the Commission to carry out before June 
2003, "a study (…) concerning burden sharing between Member States and the Union for the management of 
external borders.”  
The Commission collected information from the Member States on the level and nature of financial resources 
allocated at national level to the management of external borders (controls and surveillance of persons). 
Gathering detailed and comparable data proved difficult, and such analytical methodology did not allow the 
Commission to conclude in a detailed way on the questions raised. However, the data gathered did confirm the 
very substantial size of the investments and operational costs arising from the management of external border 
surveillance, of which the control of persons is a significant part. 
A few figures, gathered on the basis of the above mentioned data, may help to illustrate the size and nature of 
key investments made by some Member States for surveillance at external borders. In Greece, expenditure in 
2002 on transport amounted to € 99.8 million (while € 3.6 million was spent on the maintenance of these means 
of transport). These include all land vehicles, helicopters and light aircraft for the surveillance of the coast and 
the territorial waters, as well as vessels for the high seas. On the other hand, € 28 million was spent on 
equipment for surveillance (for example mobile and fixed camera’s, radar receptors etc) In Spain € 67.5 million 
was spent on transport and € 66.6 million on equipment in 2002. In addition, in the same year Spain spent €25.6 
million on SIVE – the Service Integral of Vigilancia en el Estrecho – the system to follow vessels in the Strait of 
Gibraltar. In Italy, in the same period € 60 million was spent on means of transport. 
Under the Schengen Facility, the seven Member States benefiting from the instrument, receive 953 million for 
2004 -2006 for the implementation of the Schengen acquis and external borders control. Poland receives 311 
million, of which 70% is supposed to be used by the border guards. Out of the 164 million allocated to Hungary, 
about 112 million will be used for border infrastructure and operating equipment, mainly for the border guards. 
Slovenia, which receives in total 118 million, will use 36.4 million of the sum allocated for 2004 (39.4 million) 
for border infrastructure. All the seven Member States will make considerable investments in setting up relevant 
IT and communication systems. It has to be noted that the financial contribution given by the Community under 
this Facility is not sufficient to cover the real cost for Schengen in any of the beneficiary countries.  
1.3 Fighting illegal immigration through joint and integrated return management  
The number of illegal migrants at present living in EU Member States is a particular 
challenge. These persons do not, or no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry to, presence in, or 
residence on the territories of the Member States of the European Union either because they 
entered illegally or overstayed their visa or residence permit, or because their asylum claim 
has been finally rejected. These persons have no legal status enabling them to stay in the 
territory of the Member States and can be either encouraged to leave the European Union 
voluntarily, or forced to do so.  
By definition, as illegal migrants do not identify themselves to the authorities, it is difficult to 
establish a clear picture of the scale of illegal migration in the EU. However, estimates of 
illegal migration flows can be derived from existing indicators linked to the phenomenon, 
such as the numbers of refused entries and removals, apprehensions of illegal migrants at the 
border or in the country, rejected applications for asylum or other forms of international 
protection, or applications for national regularisation procedures. To these numbers must be 
added the considerable number of those who do not apply for any form of international 
protection, either because they entered legally or they “overstay”. From these indicators, 
annual inflows of illegal migration into the EU are thought to reach over six figures.  
Various estimates based on plausible assumptions put the number of illegal migrants living in 
the Member States at several million. It is likely that the flow will continue at a significant 
rate as long as ‘push’ factors, such as unemployment or permanent low-wage levels, natural 
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disasters or ecological devastation in third countries, and ‘pull’ factors, such as the informal 
sector, the possibility of employment with higher level of wages, political stability, 
maintenance of the rule of law and effective protection of human rights and high labour 
market conditions remain important.  
In principle, third country nationals without a legal status enabling them to stay either on a 
permanent or a temporary basis, and for whom a Member State has no legal obligation to 
tolerate the residence, have to leave the EU. This is essential to ensure that admission policy 
is not undermined and to enforce the rule of law, which is a constituent element of an area of 
freedom, security and justice.  
Moreover, the large number of people living – and working – illegally in the EU poses a 
number of problems. Firstly, in terms of development of harmonious relations between the 
host population and migrant communities, as it may give rise to hostility, prejudice and social 
division. This prejudice tends to be reinforced by the association of illegal immigration with 
criminal activities in general which extends beyond their involvement in the black economy, 
In particular, even though the migrants involved are usually victims of trafficking, often 
enduring long arduous journeys in appalling and dangerous conditions, this is a source of 
substantial income to its organisers and as such fuels organised crime. Harsh treatment of and 
hostility towards illegal migrants might not only affects relations with third-country nationals 
who are in EU Member States legally but could also affect the perception of the EU in third 
countries as not being a place welcoming immigrants, thus making it more difficult to pursue 
a policy of actively encouraging the immigration of people with the skills needed by EU 
economies facing labour shortages in certain sectors, and to foster integration policies for 
legally staying third-country nationals.  
In parallel with external border controls to manage entry into the Union, it is therefore 
necessary to respond to the challenge of immigrants residing illegally in EU Member States, 
through a credible return policy. In the absence of such a policy, those who succeed in 
entering the EU illegally would be able to remain and there would be little deterrent to others 
seeking to do the same. 
In practice, however, putting into effect return policy is a considerable challenge, in particular 
for Member States with relatively low GDP’s and little experiences with the complex process 
of return management in which to develop good working relationships with the countries of 
return, whilst balancing individual rights with state interest in a credible immigration policy at 
home.  
The great majority of those who are found to be living illegally in the EU and who are ordered 
to leave do not in fact do so for a number of reasons. Whatever one thinks of these reasons, 
Member States are faced with a series of difficulties here in case of the refusal of these 
persons to leave voluntarily:  
• establishing their nationality and true identity, arranging travel documents and suitable 
means of transport,  
• verifying that they will not be at risk if they return to their home country following new 
legal challenges which would call into question administrative and judicial acts to the 
contrary,  
• persuading the governments concerned, in accordance with international law, to readmit 
their nationals or those they are held responsible for and  
• overcoming factual and organisational impediments to their removal in the process.  
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This means that illegal situations are often de facto allowed to continue, and that Member 
States tend to incur substantial and ongoing costs in detaining the people concerned for long 
periods as well as engaging in protracted legal battles over their removal.  
Given the extent of the difficulties involved, Member States are much more likely to 
overcome them if they act collectively rather than individually – in particular, if they follow 
common ‘proven’ models, such as the ‘integrated return management’ one, which seek to 
reduce as much as possible risks and impediments. In addition to implementing at national 
level practices, based on past successful experiences, Member States could also share more 
information on return management processes, the people who have had removal orders served 
against them, on the experience of implementing different measures and incentives to 
encourage voluntary return and on conditions in third countries. Finally, the cost of return 
operations and of assistance and support in these countries before and after their return could 
be shared more across Member States. 
How many returnees are there and how much do Member States spend on return management?  
As detailed above, the estimated number of illegal immigrants in Europe is probably of several million. In the 
context of consultations for the drafting of the current proposal, information on the numbers of people returned 
and the cost involved were requested from Member States. Available data are not comparable but they do 
provide an illustration of existing needs, as well as of the share of responsibilities between Member States.  
If the number of return decisions issued every year is taken as a departure point, available data of the Member 
States for 2002 to 2004 point to an annual average of around 680 thousand return decisions. (See table 7 in the 
Annex) 
For voluntary return under an IOM Assisted Voluntary Return Programme the costs range from € 500 to 900 per 
person on average. This would include tickets, escorts (where necessary) and a small reintegration grant. The 
issue of costing of enforced return presents far more difficulties, inter alia because geography and the means of 
transportation differ across Member States. During the consultation process mentioned above, data on direct 
costs on return was made available, as follows:  
– In Spain, a total of € 38 million was spent in 2004 (transportation and escorts), of which € 22 million on 
charter flights; the total number of people returned was 27.600. 
– Expenditure in France was slightly less in the same year, totalling € 34 million, the greatest item being 
commercial flights (€ 33 million). It must be noted however that these costs on the one hand, cover not only 
transportation but also translation costs and costs of refusals at airports, but on the other, only relate to the top 
5 nationality. The total number of people returned of these five nationalities was 16.500. 
– In Ireland, 599 persons were removed at the cost of € 1,7 million , excluding staff cost, last year. It must be 
borne in mind that from this country few direct flights to the country of return can be effected. 
– In Hungary, about € 198.000 was spent on removal by air for 286 persons in 2003, including the tickets, 
tickets of the escorts and insurance and air tax.  
– In Belgium, a total of 7.923 people were forcibly removed in 2003, for a total cost of € 7,5 million. This 
includes transportation and escorts (including where necessary medical cost). 
– In the Netherlands in 2003 € 9,6 million was spent on flight tickets, travel costs of escorts, charter costs and 
other travel costs. The estimated number of persons affected by these operations was 19.400.  
– Finally, in Germany data based on the federal budget point to a total of almost € 18 million (covering 
transportation only) for around 30.000 people removed in 2004. It must be pointed out that removals are 
generally in the competence of the Länder, and expenditure at this level can be reasonably estimated at € 20 
million. 
In general, the cost of enforced return varies from case to case. Some expulsion are relatively simple (without 
escorts, IATA tariff), others can amount to € 10.000 per person, in particular in the absence of a direct flight.  
The purpose of this illustration is to assert existing needs in this regard rather than setting global amounts at EU 
level. It is believed that European intervention in this field should aim at compensating the unfair burden placed 
on some Member States in the return of illegally staying third country nationals, and thus the bulk of the 
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expenditure should remain at national level. Integrated return management will then seek to intervene where the 
needs are greatest and where a coordinated approach may yield the greatest benefits.  
From the data gathered on the cost of return, an average cost of return, including only the cost 
of arranging transport for returnees back to their countries of origin, together with their 
escorts has been calculated and amounts to around € 1.000 per person returning in most 
Member States. In a country like Germany, it is somewhat more, at around € 1.600 a person, 
while in the new Member States, it tends to be less (around € 600 in the Czech Republic and 
just under € 350 in Latvia and Lithuania). Much depends here, however, on the main 
countries to which people are returned, the length of the flights involved (whether for 
example, to Eastern European countries or the Far East) and whether they are direct flights or 
not. The overall cost of return operations, including the cost of detention and of other 
activities, undertaken both in EU Member States and in third countries, is clearly much higher 
than this, though insufficient data are available to indicate how much higher it is likely to be.  
The cost also depends on whether the return is voluntary or enforced. This is the case even if 
the estimation is limited to the cost of transportation of returnees and that of their escorts 
alone. Although the extent of the difference shown by the data collected varies significantly, 
the cost of enforced return, as might be expected, is in almost all cases higher than when the 
return is voluntary. The difference, therefore varies from enforced returns costing an 
estimated 23% more per person than voluntary returns in Germany (this figure is very 
approximate because it includes a broad estimate of expenditure by the Länder, which bear 
much of the costs of enforced returns, as well as by Federal Government) and around 90% 




On present levels of return, the estimated average cost of transportation would imply a total 
cost on this item alone of over € 200 million in the EU as a whole – and clearly several times 
higher as regards the total cost of return policy. 
1.4 Immigration and the integration of legally staying third country nationals  
According to EUROSTAT, in 2003 the population of the EU 25 increased by 1,9 million, an 
annual rate of 0,4%, mainly due to net migration of 1,7 million, while the natural increase was 
only 0,2 million
4
. In 2003, net migration in the EU 25 was +3,7 per 1.000 inhabitants. Cyprus 
(+17,9‰), Spain (+14,2‰) and Italy (+8,9‰) registered the highest rates. Positive net 
migration was recorded in all Member States except Lithuania (-1,8‰), Latvia and Poland 
(both -0,4‰) and Estonia (-0,3‰). These figures clearly show that migration has become the 
main element of demographic growth in the EU. 
Migration presents particular challenges - in each Member State of the EU national citizens 
live side by side with migrants. These people are either citizens of another Member State, 
exercising their right to move and reside freely within the territory of another Member State, 
or nationals or stateless persons from countries outside the EU. In the latter case, they are 
regarded as ‘third country nationals’ and they are subject to specific rights and obligations, 
                                                 
3
 Since the number of cases in Hungary are relatively small, the large difference might reflect differences 
in the countries of destination. However, Hungary gave the specific example of the enforced return of a 
Chinese national from Budapest to Beijing via Moscow at a cost of over € 3.000, including escort, as 
compared with a similar person returning voluntarily at a cost of around € 330. 
4
 Source : Eurostat (Press release STAT/04/105, 31 August 2004) 
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defined under national law, in accordance with the provisions of Community legislation on 
visas, asylum and immigration. 
Migration from third countries into the EU is a daily reality in each Member State: on 1 
January 2003 the population of the EU 25 was 454.6 million of which 15.2 million were third 
country nationals. This is more than double the number of EU nationals who have chosen to 
reside in another EU Member State
5
. While the relative share of third country nationals varies 
considerably in Member States, all are confronted with the phenomenon of increasing ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic diversity in their societies and the need to manage ‘intercultural 
relationships’.  
Migrants, and in particular third-country nationals, represent a specific group in need of 
assistance to integrate because they face different problems to other disadvantaged groups, 
including ethnic minorities, many of whom may have been living in the EU for many years as 
EU citizens. Third-country nationals are often not familiar with European values, and may 
have very limited knowledge of the language of the host community and of ways of doing 
everyday things. Equally importantly, they sometimes do not have the same rights and 
obligations as nationals of an EU Member State. Indeed, third-country nationals may be liable 
to severe sanctions, in some cases involving a withdrawal of the right to abode, if they do not 
comply with regulations relating to them or do not follow specified procedures. For example 
in some Member States third-country nationals are obliged to fulfil certain integration 
measures in order to obtain residence permit.  
Currently, migrants from third countries are not necessarily fully integrated into EU societies 
in the widest sense of the term. This is demonstrated, inter alia, by: 
• the large number of immigrants living in deprived urban areas in poor housing conditions 




• the relatively low level of public involvement of third-country nationals in social and 




• the relatively small number of immigrants participating in the decision making processes 
including their lack of political rights; 
• the relatively large number of newly arrived third-country nationals who do not know the 
language of the host country and therefore are in need of language tuition
8
; 
• the marginalisation of migrants with a different religious background, with a potential for 
leading to alienation and extremism; 
• evidence of continuing racism and xenophobia in society and of the fact that many 
immigrants are still met with hostility; 
                                                 
5
 It is important to note that these figures relate to third country nationals and not to foreign born population. 
The percentage of foreign born population is certainly higher than of third country nationals, as many third 
country nationals have received the citizenship of the host country after a certain period of residence. The 
number of EU nationals residing in another Member States was around 6,7 million.  
6 
Migrant Integration in European Cities, Second Report, October 2003, Ethno Barometer 
7 See Migration and Integration as Challenges to European Society, Centre for Migration and Policy 
Research, University of Oxford. 
8 Member States are focussing more on immigrants language abilities and an increasing number of 
Member States provides language tuition for newly arrived third-country nationals. See COM(2004)508 
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• many children of migrants tend to perform relatively poorly in school and have higher drop 
out rates
9
. The share of 18-24 years old having lower secondary education or less 




• current employment rates show that the proportion of third-country nationals in work is 




• the disproportionate number of third-country nationals of who are in employment who are 
employed in the lower skilled segments in the labour market e.g. low quality service jobs
12
. 
The importance of stronger policies to promote the integration of immigrants in the EU is 
clearly reflected in the Hague Programme. Legislation safeguarding the rights of long-term 
residents, legislation on family reunification and legislation on combating discrimination, 
racism and xenophobia, have all been agreed upon and are now transposed into national law 
or shortly will be. These directives constitute the backbone of EU integration policy.  
The Commission intends to present later this year a Communication on the setting up of a 
coherent European framework in the field of integration of third-country nationals. Based on 
the recently agreed common basic principles for integration, the common legislative EU 
framework for immigration of third country nationals and ahead of the new constitutional 
Treaty, this Communication will outline new ideas for future co-operation between Member 
States at EU level in the field of integration of third-country nationals. The Communication 
will at the same time complement the legal basis put forward for the European Integration 
Fund.  
What do Member States spend on welcoming new migrants?  
It is almost impossible given the data available to compare expenditure on integration activities across Member 
States. It is particularly difficult because Member States tend to have different participants in their integration 
programmes and a different coverage of those potentially in need of assistance in this respect. In addition, 
expenditure on integration activities is undertaken not only by central government but also by the regions, local 
authorities and municipalities. Perhaps most importantly, the types of activity and programme included in such 
activities are very different in different countries: some providing much more extensive and detailed content than 
others. Nevertheless, the following examples give an idea of the scale of expenditure on integration programmes 
across the EU:  
• In the city of Vienna, expenditure in 2003 on welcome information packages amounted to € 38.000 for an 
estimated 2.950 participants from among migrants granted permission to reside in the city, while a further € 
420.000 was spent on language tuition.  
• The Flemish Community in Belgium spent € 8.800.000 on introduction activities (excluding language 
tuition) for third-country nationals in 2003. 4.638 people participated, which implies an estimated cost per 
person of € 1.897. 
• In Denmark, € 108.600.000 was spent in 2003 on introduction courses (civic orientation, language tuition 
and labour market training) for newly arrived immigrants and refugees. Some 28.898 persons took part in 
the programmes, implying a cost per person of € 3.758.  
• In the Netherlands, about € 50.000.000 was spent on introduction courses (civic orientation, language tuition 
and labour market training) for newly arrived immigrants and refugees in 2003. 16.991 people participated 
giving a cost per person of € 2.942.  
                                                 
9 Migration and Integration as Challenges to European Society, Centre for Migration and Policy 
Research, University of Oxford.  
10 Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM(2004)508 
11 Employment in Europe 2003 
12 Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM(2004)508 
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• In Finland, expenditure on integration programmes, including language tuition, civic orientation, labour 
market training for third-country nationals granted permission to stay amounted to € 18.700.000 in 2003. 
With about 10.000 participants, the cost per person amounted to € 1.870.  
• In the Czech Republic, total expenditure on introductory activities for recognised refugees amounted to € 
292.707 in 2003. With 39 participants, this implies a cost per person of around € 7.500.  This figures, 
however, includes the costs of housing them.  
• In Poland. € 269.052 were spent in 2003 on introductory activities for recognised refugees. 384 persons 
participated so that the average cost per person amounted to € 700.  
1.5 Asylum: upholding standards on international protection without fail  
The enlarged EU receives about 75% of the asylum claims registered by the UNHCR in its 
‘top 36 asylum countries’. Over the last two years the EU has on average received slightly 
more than 75.000 asylum seekers each quarter a year, amounting to 300.000 asylum 
applications a year.  
Historical factors influencing the rise and fall in application numbers in the EU in the 1990s 
include the fall of Communism, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and changes in individual 
States which brought about particular pressures to flee (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, 
DRC, Iraq). While asylum flows in Member States decreased from a high point in the early 
1990s, the importance of the management of asylum as a political issue increased in most 
Member States and that is reflected in the level of public scrutiny and the weight of national 
legislation brought to bear on the issue in the main EU destination countries in the late 1990s 
and the early years of this century. 
Over the last five years the EU has developed common standards affecting the obligations of 
Member States with regards to the reception of asylum seekers and asylum procedures, the 
integration of refugees and of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. These standards will also 
have repercussions for the voluntary return of (rejected) asylum seekers, refugees and 
displaced persons. Member States are seeking enhance efficiency and decrease the duration of 
asylum procedures. The new common standards aim at reducing divergences in interpretation 
of the needs for protection and thereby ensuring that persons who are genuinely in need of 
protection receive equivalent treatment throughout the EU, wherever they apply for asylum or 
acquire a right of abode. Such a level playing field is essential in an EU where the Dublin II 
Regulation, partially due to the implementation of Eurodac, has put in place an effective 
system for determining the one and only Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
claim, thus reducing secondary movements and forum shopping, in an area without internal 
borders.  
The situation of Member States faced with an influx of asylum seekers is very different, due 
to a variety of factors, such as the relative level of wealth, the geographical position, the 
existence of historic links with third countries of origin of asylum seekers, and the presence 
on the Member State’s territory of existing communities of refugees and third country 
nationals from certain countries of origin. These conditions, as well as national differences in 
legal frameworks related to asylum, despite the level playing field established under the first 
stage of the Common European Asylum System, may continue to lead to secondary 
movements between Member States, of asylum seekers or persons benefiting from 
international protection, even if they do not effectively have the right to circulate throughout 
the EU.  
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Moreover, there has been a trend in Member States with significant arrivals to enhance 
efficiency and decrease the duration of asylum procedures and reception. The new climate of 
‘efficiency’ and potential policy competition in this regard has heightened the challenge of 
correctly implementing common standards introducing the right to housing and daily 
allowance for asylum seekers and a right to admission based on Community definitions for 
refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, bearing in mind human rights and 
humanitarian considerations. This development reinforces the case for ensuring a balance of 
efforts between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving 
persons in need of international protection.  
What is the cost of asylum systems?  
It is difficult to have precise and comparable economic data on the cost of asylum systems in Member States, as, 
firstly, these figures are considered highly political at Member State level, and are therefore not widely used. 
Methods vary in calculation of such costs; some Member States include in their estimates all costs related to 
asylum related measures (including running costs of administration of the asylum procedures, social welfare and 
health benefits of asylum seekers and refugees etc); others only count the costs related to direct provision of 
services to asylum seekers or refugees. For example, Germany estimated that the cost of their reception system 
in 2002 was € 1,5 billion, while Ireland estimated the total cost of their reception, integration and voluntary 
return measures at € 200 million. In France, the cost of providing reception facilities alone to asylum seekers was 
estimated at € 170 million. It is clear, however, that the total cost of maintaining a quality asylum system can 
have a significant bearing on public expenses. 
2. WHAT ARE THE MAIN POLICY OBJECTIVES? 
To address the challenges described above, the following general objectives need to be set out 
in a coherent EU framework involving external borders, visas, illegal immigration, integration 
and return:  
• Establish support for the adequate implementation at national level of control and 
surveillance of external borders within a common integrated border management system 
for those Member States who endure a lasting, heavy, financial burden due to the long and 
difficult stretches of their external borders and an exceptional migratory pressure on these 
borders;  
• Introduce support for Member States who implement the common visa policy, with a view 
to increasing the effectiveness of consular authorities, enhancing their synergies and 
reducing the burden on border control authorities;  
• Stepping up measures in third countries preventing illegal entries through the external 
borders and thus reducing the incidence of illegal immigration to the benefit of all Member 
States; 
• Increase the effectiveness of the implementation at national level of the fight against illegal 
immigration by supporting the return of illegally resident third country nationals within the 
common framework of an integrated return management and in accordance with common 
standards on return procedures;  
• Promote the integration of third-country nationals legally residing in Member States 
through support to national integration strategies, with a view to ensuring the full potential 
of third country nationals to their own benefit and to the benefit of the host society in terms 
of economic and social aspects sand civic citizenship;  
• Ensure a balance of efforts between Member States regarding their international protection 
obligations by supporting a common asylum policy based on an equitable sharing of 
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responsibility and financial burden between Member States in receiving and bearing the 
consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons.  
These should be EU objectives, as it is in the common interest of all Member States that they 
will receive support for implementing such objectives, as explained in section 1.  
They can be further developed into the following specific objectives for respectively external 
borders, return, integration and asylum.  
2.1 External borders 
Given the uneven division of responsibility between Member States for controlling the 
external borders of the EU, the policy objectives to achieve are:  
1. to implement in the Member States the common integrated border management 
system; 
2. to make it easier and faster for authorised travellers to enter the EU in conformity 
with the Schengen acquis while protecting the EU against illegal entry; 
3. to achieve a uniform application of the EU law by Member States and an overall 
efficiency of national border guards in carrying out their tasks in accordance with EU 
law;  
4. to enhance the efficiency of the issuing of visas and the implementation of other pre-
frontier checks.  
These general aims can be translated into a series of specific and operational objectives of 
which the key ones, in terms of added value and cost-effectiveness for the European Union, 
would be the following:  
• improving efficiency of control and surveillance measures through the use of state of the 
art technology; 
• establishing the necessary infrastructures to improve efficient flow management at border 
crossing points;  
• enhancing the capacity of the human resources allocated to border management, for 
instance by implementing the common core curriculum to be set up by the Agency;  
• improving the coordination and information exchange at national level for all relevant 
authorities involved in securing effective border control;  
• reducing as much as possible illegal entries at external borders through operations in third 
countries, in cooperation with these countries;  
• enhancing the coordination and cooperation between Member States as regards the 
implementation of the common visa policy. 
Actions to be funded could include land, air and sea border and pre-frontier infrastructure 
(e.g. construction, renovation or upgrading of border crossing points, border stations and other 
related buildings, e.g. centres for immigrants apprehended when crossing the border illegally; 
permanent border surveillance systems at green or blue borders etc.); operating equipment 
related to border control (laboratory equipment, document examination equipment, detection 
tools), means of transport for the surveillance of external borders, like vehicles, helicopters, 
planes, ships etc.; IT and other communication systems needed for real time exchange of 
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information between relevant authorities and exchange programmes and training of border 
guards, immigration officers and consular officers etc. 
2.2 Return 
The policy objective in this area is to support and encourage Member State efforts to improve 
the management of the voluntary and forced return of illegal third country nationals in all 
aspects, taking account of Community legislation in this area. Indeed, once agreement will be 
reached on the planned Directive on common standards on procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third country nationals (a proposal is due to be presented by the 
Commission to the European Parliament and Council this spring), the effective and uniform 
application of the agreed common standards should be fostered and Member States actions 
relating to this objective should be able to benefit from Community financing as far as these 
actions are also covered by the specific objectives of the upcoming financial instrument 
In particular, the following specific objectives should be pursued:  
1. to promote the introduction of integrated return management procedures by all 
Member States and to improve the operation and organisation of existing procedures; 
2. to enhance co-operation between Member States in the conception and 
implementation of integrated return management procedures and practices; 
3. to promote an effective and uniform application of common standards on return. 
These aims will be pursued through actions such as: 
• the development of effective and lasting operational co-operation between Member State 
authorities and consular and immigration services in third countries, with a view to 
facilitating the receipt of travel documents for the return of third country nationals and 
ensuring speedy and successful removal procedures; 
• developing co-operation between Member States in the collection and dissemination of 
information on the country of return to potential returnees; 
• increasing the number of illegal migrants opting to return voluntarily by encouraging this 
through better targeted and more attractive assisted voluntary return programmes and other 
means; 
• simplifying enforced return procedures and improving the capacity of courts to deal with 
cases, with a view to reducing the period of detention of those awaiting forced removal 
without infringing their basic rights; 
• formulating joint integrated return plans, including implementing joint voluntary return 
programmes in respect of particular countries or regions and arranging joint flights, thus 
reinforcing the message of an effective management of migration flows by the EU; 
• implement joint return operations, thus making better use of existing national resources 
and expertise for the common good of the fight against illegal immigration throughout the 
EU; 
• encouraging exchange of information, support, advice and best practice between Member 
States in dealing with the return of people to specific countries and/or of particularly 
vulnerable groups; 
• carrying out joint measures enabling the reception of readmitted persons in the country of 
origin or former residence; 
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• developing measures to ensure the effective reintegration of people in their country of 
origin or former residence after they return; 
• improving the capacity of competent authorities to enforce removal decisions with full 
respect for the rights of the people concerned and for their dignity in accordance with 
relevant EU standards; 
• ensuring the provision of specific assistance to vulnerable groups such as children, the 
elderly, people with disabilities, pregnant women and those who have been subjected to 
torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence. 
2.3 Integration of third-country nationals 
The Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration which were adopted by Governments 
at the JLS Council on 19 November 2004 following the Hague Programme underline the need 
for a holistic approach to integration. It is stated that not only within Member States but also 
at the European level, steps are needed to ensure that the focus on integration is a mainstream 
consideration in policy formulation and implementation, while at the same time specific 
policies for integrating third-country nationals are being developed.  
In accordance with the common basic principles, the specific policies for integrating legally 
residing immigrants in Member States are intended to:  
• Provide opportunities and create incentives for immigrants to integrate and overcome 
language difficulties and/or problems relating to understanding the norms, values and 
traditions of the host society or satisfying job requirements; 
• Be pro-active in the design and implementation of national introduction programmes and 
activities, the capacity building of migrant organisations and of their interlocutors at all 
levels of government;  
• Recognise new challenges in migratory pressure and address them through a successful 
integration strategy, which is required either because the Member States concerned have 
experienced a significant influx of migrants over the last few years, such as the Member 
States in the south of the EU, or because they are at the start of a period of increased 
immigration, as in the case of some of the Member States which acceded to the European 
Union in 2004;  
• Overcome shortcomings in infrastructure at local, regional and national levels to deal with 
migratory inflows, and promote coherence between policy design and its implementation 
on the ground;  
• Combat intolerance and prejudice among the host population, and to raise awareness of the 
importance of diversity in society, including among public and private sector service 
providers;  
• Promote dialogue and consultation between political decision makers and local 
communities on the challenges faced by migrants, about their needs and circumstances and 
about ways of improving their position.  
To achieve such policies, in particular to promote the integration of third country nationals 
having recently arrived and been admitted by a Member State to reside in its territory, the 
following specific objectives, which turn into concrete action the common basic principles 
(see footnotes), should be pursued : 
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1. Facilitate the organization and implementation of admission programmes for 
migrants, strengthening their integration component and anticipating the needs of 
third-country nationals. 
2. Contribute to the organisation and implementation of introduction programmes and 




3. Increase civic, cultural and political participation of third country nationals in the 




4. Strengthen the capacity of Member States’ public and private service providers to 
interact with third country nationals and their organizations and to answer better the 
needs of different groups of third country nationals 
5. Strengthen the ability of the host society to adjust to increasing diversity by targeting 
integration actions at the host population.
15
 




These objectives and the concrete measures for pursuing them, it should be emphasised, are 
complementary to the actions envisaged under the European Social Fund. The latter are 
directed at strengthening economic and social cohesion by supporting Member State policies 
aimed at achieving full employment, improving quality and productivity at work and 
promoting social inclusion as well as at reducing regional employment disparities. In the case 
of migrants, who are specifically recognised as a disadvantaged group on the labour market in 
need of special support, their focus is primarily on increasing their participation in 
employment through guidance and language training and the validation of competencies 
acquired abroad as well as through the provision of suitable training. ESF actions, therefore, 
are designed to integrate migrants into society largely through improving their access to 
employment, which is essential if they are to avoid social exclusion. The activities envisaged 
under the present programme are intended to support such actions by focusing specifically on 
the civic, cultural and political dimension of social integration, which is equally necessary if 
migrants are to participate fully in society. 
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 The Common Basic Principles (JLS 19/11-04 Council): Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, 
history and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is 
essential to successful integration. (Principle no 4) 
14
 The Common Basic Principles (JLS 19/11-04 Council): Frequent interaction between immigrants and 
Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, 
education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments 
enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens. (Principle no. 7) The Common 
Basic Principles (JLS 19/11-04 Council): The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in 
the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration. 
(Principle no. 9) 
15
 The Common Basic Principles (JLS 19/11-04 Council): Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual 
accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. (Principle no. 1) 
16
 The Common Basic Principles (JLS 19/11-04 Council): Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation 
mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of 
information more effective. (Principle no. 11) 
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2.4 Asylum 
The existing financial instrument supporting the implementation of the common asylum 
policy is the European Refugee Fund. Its objective is set by the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (Article 63.2.b): to promote a balance of efforts between Member 
States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons. 
More specifically, the aim of the ERF is to express solidarity at Community level and to 
alleviate the pressures felt by Member States most affected by reception of refugees and 
displaced persons in facing the consequences of this reception, which includes reception 
conditions during asylum procedure (and ensuring fair and efficient asylum procedure), 
integration of recognised refugees and promoting voluntary return solutions for rejected 
asylum seekers and refugees who wish to return to their country of origin. Furthermore, the 
European Refugee Fund is one of the instruments of a Common Asylum policy, and as such 
the measures supported by the Fund should seek to complement and support EU legislation in 
order to support the progressive implementation of a Common Asylum System at all levels 
(common legislation and development of common best practices). 
The ERF is an important part of an overall policy for building a common European asylum 
policy. Reducing divergence between asylum systems and progressive implementation of 
common standards at EU level will have a cost, which will be greater for Member States with 
a larger number of asylum seekers and refugees, but also to new Member States. The 
Community should contribute to correcting those imbalances and to supporting Member 
States in complying with their obligations
17
. Finally, account must also be taken of the other 
objectives being formulated in related policies, such as the integration of third country 
nationals and management of illegal immigration. 
3. WHAT ARE THE POLICY OPTIONS? 
3.1 External borders 
No policy scenario 
From the magnitude of existing needs and the risks of no action as detailed above, the no-
policy scenario was given only limited consideration. Indeed, if no action is taken, some 
Member States will bear a declining share of the costs of controlling external borders as the 
Schengen Area is extended, while others bear an increasing share whilst being less able to 
bear this cost. As the new Member States become full Schengen members and the eastern 
external land border moves further east, responsibility for border control, and the related 
costs, will shift from countries such as Germany, Austria and Italy to countries such as the 
Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. Needless to say, these countries’ GDP 
per head is considerably below the EU average. Also, the external border will become longer 
and more difficult to control due to geopolitical reasons, while migratory pressure could 
increase. Migratory pressure, that includes illegal immigration, is also bound to increase at the 
Mediterranean borders, requiring an important budgetary effort from countries such as Spain, 
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 In drawing this impact assessment, and formulating the policy options available, account has been taken 
of previously established objectives underlying the European Refugee Fund and their likely 
achievement. Account also has to be taken of completion of other objectives (legislation) and the level 
of complementarity already achieved or soon to be achieved with these. 
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Italy and Greece, who have long coasts facing the African continent and Turkey, and in the 
main international airports.  
Voluntary arrangements for transferring resources between Member States  
EU intervention in this field is therefore considered necessary to preserve and strengthen 
solidarity between Member States. Theoretically, this solidarity with regard to the control of 
external borders could be achieved by establishing voluntary arrangements for transferring 
funds from those which do not have external borders, or at least not extensive ones, to those 
which do. However, the complete voluntary nature of such a scheme is unlikely to make it 
viable in practice.  
Legislative action or action through “soft law” 
Another option to be considered would be legislative action (e.g. reinforcement of common 
standards and of cooperation and information exchange mechanisms) or incentive action in a 
‘soft’ form (e.g. a Commission Action Plan as a basis of a peer review system). These options 
would increase coordination at European level, and could even contribute to a greater 
convergence in this area. But it fails to meet the stated objectives of solidarity and burden 
sharing, which seem to require that EU intervention has a financial element to it. 
To expand the budget and extend the role of the FRONTEX Agency 
An alternative to overcome the problems attached to voluntary funding arrangements would 
be to expand the budget and extend the role of the FRONTEX Agency, to include the funding 
of Member State activities. This could even lead to the creation of a corps of European Border 
Guards. This option would help to strengthen cooperation and would allow achieving high 
standards of control in all Member States. However, increasing the responsibilities of the 
Agency to include financial transfers could create accountability problems, as considerable 
resources will have to be transferred from the EC budget to be implemented not by the 
Commission but by an autonomous Agency, while creating an autonomous European Border 
Guard corps could be difficult to justify in terms of subsidiarity.  
The chosen option: an External Borders Fund  
The most relevant policy option seems to be the establishment of a financial solidarity 
mechanism at Community level to support Member States who bear a lasting and heavy 
financial burden by being responsible for controlling external borders for the benefit of the 
Union as a whole. This Fund should be designed to be a concrete expression of EU solidarity 
by providing financial assistance to those Member States which apply the Schengen 
provisions on external borders, in addition to those on internal borders (the dismantling of 
controls on entry). It would accordingly represent an explicit recognition of the tasks they 
perform in carrying out checks on people entering the EU from third countries and border 
surveillance not only in their own interests but on behalf of all Member States which have 
dismantled internal border controls. 
Support from the Fund should be extended from the outset to new Member States, as their 
external borders are operational since their accession even if they have undertaken to remove 
border controls at a later stage when they are judged ready to do so. It should also extend to 
the need for Member States to implement Community legislation in relation to specific 
situations which have arisen as a result of enlargement (the most notable example is of 
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Russians who need to cross Lithuania to reach Kaliningrad). The Fund should, in addition, 
provide support for managing visas and other similar activities undertaken before people 
reach the border, whether these are carried out in cooperation with other Member States or 
not. The efficient management of such activities by the consular services of Member States in 
third countries is an integral part of a common integrated border management system, which 
is aimed at facilitating legitimate travel into the EU while preventing illegal entry.  
Objective criteria need to be established to allocate funds to Member States. These criteria 
should take account of the various elements which add to the burden of control on the 
Member States, in particular, the length of external land and maritime borders, the number of 
authorised border crossing points, the number of travellers crossing and the extent of pressure 
caused by people refused entry. The criteria should also take account of the challenges posed 
by the risk of illegal entry affecting each border, taking into account the geopolitical situation, 
typology and geography. The assessments made by the Common Centre in Finland and in the 
future by the FRONTEX Agency will be very helpful in this regard.  
From a subsidiarity point of view, such a Fund would support Member States in carrying out 
the various tasks involved in external border control while not interfering with their 
responsibilities in respect of determining who they allow to enter their territory. 
Actions to be funded could include border crossing infrastructures and related buildings (e.g. 
border stations, helicopter landing places or lanes, etc.); operating equipment (laboratory 
equipment, document examination instruments, detection tools, mobile or fixed terminals for 
consulting SIS and national systems, etc.); means of transport for the surveillance of external 
borders; equipment for real time exchange of information between relevant authorities; ICT 
systems; exchange programmes and training of border guards, immigration officers and 
consular officers; etc. 
3.2 Return 
No policy scenario  
If no action is taken at EU level, the risk is that return policy in most Member States will 
continue to be driven nationally and not develop to its full potential. Synergies will remain 
unlocked and opportunities will be missed to develop better national strategies, to build 
cooperation on the basis of national good practices and to jointly implement operations or test 
new measures. A large number of people who have been declared to be illegal residents will 
remain in the country concerned, with adverse effects on efforts both to implement a managed 
immigration policy and to ensure good relations between third country nationals and the host 
community. 
Regularisations instead of returns  
An alternative policy option involves regularisation. From time to time, some Member States 
have decided to regularise certain groups of third-country nationals residing illegally by 
allowing them to register their presence in the country and granting them permission to 
remain. While this overcomes the problem of encouraging or forcing them to return to their 
country of origin or former residence, it does not tackle the main problems, as set out above, 
and is likely to encourage rather than deter future illegal migration. The Commission has 
published in 2004 a Study on the links between legal and illegal migration (COM(2004)412 
final) where the issue of regularisations has been examined through the concrete experience of 
 EN 22   EN 
wide-scale regularisations carried out by eight Member States. The result of the analysis is 
that such programs do not appear to have had a long term effect in reducing the levels of 
illegal migrants; on the contrary, it appeared that they may serve as an additional pull factor, 
since the stocks of illegal migrants seem to replenish regularly and new regularisation 
programmes are required. Furthermore, such wide-scale measures have implications also for 
other Member States of the EU, due to the abolition of internal borders control. This fallback 
on the other Member States will be even more important once the long-term residents 
Directive
18
 will be applicable as of January 2006: in fact this Directive foresees that, once 
acquired the long-term resident status after five years of legal residence in a Member State, 
migrants will be able to move to another Member State for working, study or other reasons. 
Finally, as in most cases Member States tend to issue renewable temporary permits, the 
persons concerned could fall back into illegal status if they later cease to fulfil the conditions 
of the permit. In some Member States a regularisation operation was followed by an 
increasing number of family reunification applications. 
Harmonisation of legislation on return  
The Commission is currently elaborating a proposal for a Directive on common standards on 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals. The 
Directive will introduce a level playing field in the EU on return procedures. Such standards 
cannot address the problems identified in terms of the effectiveness of the implementation of 
return policy, but will be another essential part of the comprehensive EU return policy as 
outlined in the Council Action Plan on Return. 
In this context, solutions may be proposed which also have an impact on financing return. On 
the one hand, the possibilities for mutual recognition already offered by Directive 2001/40/EC 
may be extended to all kinds of return decisions and removal orders and the financial 
compensation mechanism agreed upon in Council Decision 2004/191/EC of 23.2.2004 may 
be made applicable to all these cases. Alternatively, a second Member State may ask the first 
Member States to take back an illegally staying third country national, thus passing on 
responsibility for the whole return procedure including the charge of all connected costs. 
These possibilities will, however, not be an alternative because they would not tackle the real 
problems. They would not constitute a solidarity mechanism and not contain the needed 
support to the efforts made by Member States to improve the management of return in all its 
dimensions.  
Solidarity between Member States on a voluntary basis  
Member States could be asked to transfer funds voluntarily from their national budgets to 
assist countries with a large number of illegal migrants where the scale of the return problem 
is greatest, but it seems unrealistic to expect Member States to comply with such a voluntary 
policy at large scale 
Comprehensive implication of the External Border Agency 
Article 2(1)(f) of Council Regulation (EC) N° 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a 
the FRONTEX Agency sets out that the Agency shall provide Member States with the 
necessary support in organising joint return operations. Article 9 paragraph 1 provides that, 
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subject to the Community return policy, the Agency shall provide the necessary assistance for 
organising joint return operations of Member States. The Agency may use Community 
financial means available in the field of return, and under paragraph 2 of the same provision it 
is stated that the Agency shall identify best practices on the acquisition of travel documents 
and the removal of illegally present third country nationals. 
As envisaged under the current legislation, the support of the Agency for return would consist 
of inter alia coordination of return operations between Member States (for instance an online 
register on joint flights) but there is clearly no intention to reshape the efforts by Member 
States to develop and implement effective national return policies. The main purpose of the 
Agency is to support Member States in their tasks regarding border control. The Agency does 
not have the resources to take over (significantly) national action on return. 
Even if resources were available, the Agency should not be put in charge of improving the 
design and implementation of national return operations of 25 Member States other than 
through an exchange of information on best practices. A far reaching involvement of the 
Agency with the daily return practices by Member States would be incompatible with the 
principle of subsidiarity which dictates that action should be taken at the most appropriate 
level, in this case at the level of immigration services, (local) police or border guards 
responsible for the return of illegally residing third country nationals. A comprehensive 
implication would probably require the Agency to have the capacity to enforce administrative 
orders on behalf of the Member States and confront the Agency in its work with the different 
national policies and practices. 
Compensation under existing financial instruments 
Existing financial instruments, in particular the ERF, AENEAS and ARGO, might potentially 
be used to support the actions envisaged under this programme.  
The ERF, however, is limited to the voluntary return of asylum seekers and persons benefiting 
from international protection in the Member States due to its legal basis of Article 63(2)(b). 
This legal basis does not allow the ERF II to fund the return of third country nationals that are 
not or no longer in need of international protection (such as failed asylum seekers). The 
actions covered by the ERF may concern in particular information and advice about voluntary 
return programmes and the situation in the country of origin and/or general or vocational 
training and help in resettlement. Rejected asylum seekers make up the most significant 
proportion of potential target population for return in many Member States which face 
particular problems in returning this group. The political implications arising from sustained 
failure to do so are considerable.  
The aim of AENEAS is limited to giving specific and complementary financial and technical 
aid to third countries in order to support their efforts to better manage migratory flows in all 
their dimensions. It is particularly intended for third countries actively engaged in the 
preparation or in the implementation of readmission agreements initialled, signed or 
concluded with the European Community. The programme is included into the external 
relations activities. AENEAS and the planned return Fund could be complementary, insofar as 
the Return Fund would focus on the return act itself (and necessary short-term financial 
needs) whilst AENEAS could provide for structural assistance ensuring sustainable long-term 
solutions for the returned person in the third country. 
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The aim of ARGO is limited to the promotion of administrative cooperation between national 
authorities and will end in 2006.  
Therefore, none addresses the integrated return procedures which are the objective of the 
policy and to use the three for separate actions in the areas they cover is likely to be 
inefficient, even leaving aside their limited budgets and, in the case of ARGO and AENEAS, 
their limited duration. 
The chosen option: a Return Fund 
A distinct fund established with the particular objective of supporting an integrated return 
management policy seems best equipped to achieve the objectives set out above. By creating a 
separate instrument which is targeted at return, the specific problems identified with respect to 
persuading or coercing illegal migrants to leave the country in which they are residing can be 
addressed.  
The Return Fund will need to work in complementarity with the other financial instruments 
mentioned above which will remain from 2007 onwards and address return issues: the ERF 
and the successor instruments to AENEAS. Each instrument will address specific aspects of 
the return to their country of origin or former residence.  
Lessons learnt from the Afghanistan Return Plan on complementarity  
The work carried out by the Commission and the Member States in the framework of the Afghan Co-
ordination Return Group (ACRG) has helped to identify and understand the advantages and the challenges 
associated with managing return operations in an EU framework. The experiences with the implementation 
of the Afghanistan Return Plan is still limited, but the lessons learnt so far are relevant in the wider context 
of the further development and implementation of the general EU return policy and confirm the possible 
positive interaction of the Return Fund (focusing on short-term return related financing) and AENEAS 
(focusing on sustainable long-term solutions) as complementary and mutually reinforcing financial 
instruments.  
For further information see the Commission staff working paper ‘Review of the Afghanistan Return Plan 
(SEC (2005)340). 
The European Return Fund will seek to promote the development of integrated set of return 
measures aiming at putting in place in Member States an effective programme. This should 
cover all phases of the return process, from the pre-departure phase and the return as such to 
the reception and reintegration in the country of return and should be tailored to take account 
of the specific situation in different countries. At the basis of such a programme should be an 
analysis of the situation in the Member State(s) with respect to the targeted population, a 
realistic assessment of the potential for return and the cooperation with the countries of return, 
a planning and evaluation mechanism with respect to the return process of the targeted 
population and cooperation throughout the process with relevant stakeholders at national, 
European and international level, such as UNHCR and IOM.  
Priority should be given to cooperation between Member States to secure such an approach, 
given the cost-effectiveness and the synergies involved.  
Accordingly, the measures to be supported, when they form part of such an integrated return 
approach, would include:  
• In all cases: pre-return information, procurement of indispensable travel documents, costs 
of necessary pre-return medical checks, costs of travel and food for returnees and escorts, 
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including medical staff, accommodation for escorts, specific assistance to vulnerable 
groups such as children or people with disabilities, costs of transportation to the final 
destination in the country of return and co-operation with the authorities of the country of 
origin, former residence or transit; 
• Additionally in the case of forced return the costs for temporary accommodation of 
returnees and their escorts from the participating Member State in the organising Member 
State prior to the departure in case of joint return operations. 
• Additionally in the case of voluntary return: comprehensive pre-return information, 
assistance and counselling as well as essential expenses before return and initial expenses 
beforer return,  
• Additionally, and where considered appropriate by Member States, initial expenses after 
return, transport of the returnee’s personal belongings, adequate temporary accommodation 
for the first days after arrival in the country of return in a reception centre or a hotel if 
necessary, training and employment assistance and limited start-up support for economic 
activities where appropriate. 
• As regards the application of the common standards: education and training of staff in the 
competent administrative, law enforcement and judicial bodies as well as secondments of 
these categories of staff from other Member States;  
• As regards actions relating to the cooperation with consular authorities and immigration 
services of third countries, cost of travel and accommodation in the Member States for the 
staff of the authorities and services responsible for the identification of third country 
nationals and the verification of their travel documents.  
3.3 Integration of third country nationals  
No policy scenario  
The no-policy scenario would entail a serious risk that the problems described above would 
not be effectively tackled insofar as the civic, cultural and political dimension of integration 
would remain insufficiently addressed, even though the ESF would continue to assist migrants 
to integrate into the labour market. 
• The large variation in the effort devoted to the social integration of migrants across the EU 
is likely to continue. Without systematic exchange of information and additional resources, 
Member States with inadequate or ineffective policies are unlikely to be able to learn from 
those which have developed successful strategies.  
• The damaging effects of inadequate integration in these Member States in particular on 
third-country nationals themselves – both those already resident and newcomers –would, 
therefore, be likely to continue. 
• Accordingly, the EU economy as a whole would continue to lose out by failing to integrate 
migrants properly into society which is likely to weaken the extent to which they are able 
to participate fully in employment and contribute to the generation of economic wealth as 
well as to competitiveness through the diversity they bring both to the labour force and 
entrepreneurship.  
As stated above, the need for policy intervention has also been recognised in the Hague 
Programme and by the Common Basic Principles which underline that “the failure of one 
individual Member State can have adverse implications for other Member States and the 
European Union” and that it is in the interest of all Member States to pursue effective 
integration strategies. 
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Harmonisation of legislation on integration  
Another option was harmonisation of legislation on integration: the Constitutional Treaty 
provides a legal base for European laws or framework laws to establish measures to provide 
incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the 
integration of third country nationals residing legally in their territories. However, Article III-
267-§3 excludes “any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”. 
Open-method of co-ordination 
The Commission proposed an open method of co-ordination in respect of Community 
immigration policy in July 2001. The European Council in Laeken responded in December 
2001 by calling for a reinforcement of exchange of information on migration. The 
Commission services, therefore, introduced consultative meetings to provide a forum for 
discussion on migration issues in the EU
19
. Establishment of an open-method of co-
ordination, would considerably strengthen the current exchange. It would go beyond 
consultation and exchange of information as Member States would set national targets for 
integration policy within the framework of guidelines adopted by the Community. However, 
while this option would increase co-operation between Member States, it would not enhance 
their capacity to address the challenge of integration of third country nationals and hence 
there would be no guarantees that financial resources would be made available to support the 
implementation of EU priorities. 
The option of a financial support by a Community instrument  
Following the adoption of the legislative framework establishing a common immigration 
policy and in view of the solidarity provision in the new Constitutional Treaty, setting-up a 
financial instrument would provide support and incentives for the Member States to develop 
integration policies for integration of third-country nationals admitted in accordance with the 
legislative framework laid down in both national and Community law.  
Here, different models for financial support were considered:  
1. Integration of third-country nationals is funded via joint projects and Community 
actions (e.g. the ARGO framework model or the INTI programme):  
2. Integration of third-country nationals is solely funded within a mainstreaming 
instrument, such as the European Social Fund (ESF) 
3. Integration of third-country nationals is funded within a separate instrument 
expressing solidarity between Member States on the basis of the number of third 
country nationals legally present in the Member States.  
Model 1: integration of third-country nationals is funded via joint projects and community 
actions (e.g. the ARGO framework model or the INTI programme) 
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and a network of national contact points on integration have been set up to focus in particular on 
respectively migration phenomena and national integration policies.  
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Community actions are subject to centralised management, and specific conditions apply: 
Trans-nationality and co-operation between a number of Member States. Such an instrument 
in respect of integration would preclude funding measures at national level and it would 
therefore be difficult to take account of national challenges and priorities.  
The Common Basic Principles state that the precise integration measures a society chooses to 
implement should be determined by individual Member States. A financial instrument merely 
focusing on transnational aspects and co-operation would therefore not achieve the objective 
of being an instrument supporting the implementation of the Common Basic Principles at 
national level. 
Model 2: Integration of third-country nationals is solely funded within a mainstreaming 
instrument, such as the ESF 
Until now the ESF has considered the issue of third country nationals only in terms of their 
potential social exclusion. Third country nationals could be included within the categories of 
disadvantaged groups in general and could, under this heading, be a target group for 
integration into the labour market.  
The proposal for the ESF for the period 2007 to 2013
20
 makes a specific reference to 
migrants, in particular under the general objective of enhancing access to employment of job 
seekers and inactive people, preventing unemployment, prolonging working lives and 
increasing participation in the labour market of women and migrants.  
Even if the ESF has strengthened its focus on migrants, there remains a serious question mark 
over whether it is likely to deliver to the extent required to support all aspects of integration of 
third-country nationals in the widest sense of the term, i.e. social and political as well as 
economic:  
• First, the ESF specifically focuses on labour market integration and it does not specifically 
include actions which ensure integration of third-country nationals into other aspects of life 
(in particular, civic, political, cultural and religious aspects of the integration of migrants);  
• Second, it does not extend its actions to third country nationals with no immediate 
affiliation with the labour market. Those who are admitted for family reunification 
purposes may not necessarily have an affiliation with the labour market, or at least not 
immediately. This is in particular the case for women, who are often the drivers for 
integration of their children. It must be noted that family related migration is more than 
half of the admission in the EU of third country nationals. 
• Third, studies and evaluations carried out in Member States have shown that the 
integration strategies developed in the past, which were based on the premise that social 
integration will follow naturally from employment and economic integration, have not 
proved adequate. The earlier mentioned indicators show that there is still a need to target 
social integration of third country nationals specifically, in particular their participation in 
civic, cultural and political life. Consequently, the strategies for this form of integration 
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and the Cohesion Fund (COM (2004) 492 final) and regulations for each of these components, as well 
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have to be further developed and consolidated before a mainstream approach can be 
successfully adopted.  
• Fourth, there is no guarantee that Member States will choose to give sufficient priority to 
the social and cultural integration of third-country nationals over and above their 
integration into the labour market, even if this may be necessary to complement measures 
directed at the latter.  
• Fifth, the extent of migration and the distribution of migrants across Member States (the 
solidarity element) is not a criterion for allocation of the ESF resources. Funding is not, 
therefore, necessarily concentrated on those Member States which have the greatest needs 
in this regard, even though the integration of migrants might play a role in the allocation of 
resources within countries.  
Consequently, even under a new ESF taking into account the specific characteristics of the 
target population concerned, there would not necessarily be financial assistance to address 
fully the challenges identified in paragraph 1.4.  
Model 3: Integration of third-country nationals is funded within a separate instrument 
It follows from the above that a specific instrument is required which addresses the aspects of 
integration not covered by the ESF. By creating a separate instrument which is targeted at 
third-country national and linked with solidarity principles, the specific challenges identified 
with respect to immigrants’ lack of integration can be addressed. In particular, a separate 
instrument will affect third-country nationals’ opportunities to meet integration requirements 
in their host country, provide access to information and guidance on civic and cultural issues 
and ensure that immigrants have the opportunity to integrate into aspects of society other than 
the labour market, in particular for those not working or allowed to work.  
A targeted instrument, setting out specific objectives and allocating the resources on the basis 
of specific criteria relating to the target population, will increase the policy-impact of EC 
expenditure. The ability of a specific instrument to have a strong and direct impact in the 
policy area concerned is illustrated by the contribution made by the AENEAS programme to 
the Union’s relations with third countries. While the Community’s external cooperation 
activities and policies contribute indirectly to dealing with migratory pressure and a more 
efficient management of migration flows, the AENEAS programme has developed a specific 
additional response to the needs of third countries in their efforts to manage more effectively 
all aspects of migratory flows. In particular, the programme enables the Community to 
respond flexibly and effectively to migratory challenges and to annually adjust priorities, 
paying heed to the general principles of Community cooperation and development strategies 
regarding third countries in a coherent and complementary way. To ensure consistency, 
mechanisms have been devised to prevent overlaps with financial instruments for the Union’s 
relations with third countries. AENEAS and an instrument promoting integration of third-
country nationals in the EU could be complementary, insofar as the Integration Fund would 
focus on third country nationals present in the EU, while AENEAS could - for instance - help 
ethnic diasporas in the EU to keep in touch with their home countries and to undertake 
investment there. 
The chosen option: a separate instrument on integration for third country nationals in 
complementarity with the ESF mainstreaming approach  
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The latter has therefore been considered as the relevant policy option. To respond to the 
specific challenges listed above in the area of integration of third-country nationals, the 
instrument would intervene in six specific areas:  
• Improving the implementation of admission programmes. Facilitating a rapid and smooth 
integration of those migrants who have been explicitly invited to contribute to Member 
States’ societies. In many Member States it is recognised that these persons in particular 
provide a valuable contribution to economic growth. Their arrival is commonly seen as 
important to counteract the prospective decline in the EU’s work force in future years. 
Action should be taken to prepare their integration even before they arrive in the territory 
of the Member States.  
• The implementation of introduction programmes and introductory activities. The early 
stages of a third country national’s residence in the Member State are of particular 
importance. Introduction programmes and activities express the investment host societies 
are willing to make in the future, by: providing opportunity for migrants to learn about 
their host country and the ways of doing things, so increasing their chances of being self-
sufficient as soon as possible and of finding employment; increasing the incentive and 
motivation for migrants to integrate; making it easier for young migrants, in particular, to 
integrate and so prevent identity problems and reduce delinquency: facilitating the 
development of targeted and flexible integration policies and activities, taking account of 
the special needs of third-country nationals and encouraging the development of new and 
innovative approaches to integration.  
• Promoting active citizenship through civic, cultural, religious and political participation. 
These activities can contribute by increasing the knowledge of migrants of the history, 
traditions, norms, values and local customs of the host society, facilitating dialogue 
between different religious communities; encouraging migrants to take responsibility and 
an active part in local community life, increasing their understanding of political processes 
and encouraging them to participate in decision making processes and increasing their 
possibilities of applying for citizenship. In short, active citizenship can highlight skills and 
open up avenues to third country nationals to realise their full potential in host societies.  
• Supporting capacity building in public and private sector service providers in Member 
States for third country nationals. Much interaction between the latter and other citizens 
takes place in such mainstream organisations as schools, hospitals, communal housing 
societies etc. Opening up these providers through diversity management will reinforce the 
motivation and willingness of third country nationals to participate in society. This can be 
achieved by: making service providers more aware of diversity issues and helping them to 
develop inter-cultural communication skills; increasing co-operation between local, 
regional and national authorities responsible for integration and helping to bring about 
better coordination between the design of policy and its operation on the ground; raising 
awareness of the benefits of putting in place an effective policy for managing diversity; 
increasing co-operation between local, regional and national authorities responsible for 
integration and helping to bring about better coordination between the design of policy and 
its operation on the ground; raising awareness of the benefits of putting in place an 
effective policy for managing diversity.  
• Helping society to adjust to diversity by making the host population more aware of the true 
facts about migration and about the people concerned, increasing tolerance towards other 
cultures and religions and so helping to strengthen social cohesion, increasing dialogue and 
interaction between migrants and the host population and actively involving private bodies 
(including SME) in the integration process. 
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• Policy development, monitoring and evaluation of policies and strategies by: stimulating 
the collection of relevant data on migration in the Member States so providing the basis for 
informed discussion and decision-making; ensuring that the effectiveness of integration 
efforts are assessed on an ongoing basis and that programmes are responsive to immigrants 
needs; enabling policy-makers across the EU to learn from past experience not only of 
policies pursued in their own countries but also of those pursued elsewhere, so helping to 
improve the policies implemented in the future across Member States. 
The Integration Fund will build on past experience, namely the pilot projects on integration of 
third country nationals (INTI) started in 2002 with a budget of €4 million. Nearly 300 
applications were received in the first two years, applying for more than €85 million whereas 
the total budget available was only €10 million.  
The pilot projects complement the policy outlined in the Communication on Immigration, 
integration and employment adopted in June 2003 in which the Commission presented its 
views on how to elaborate comprehensive and multi-dimensional policies on the integration 
of legally residing third-country nationals. According to the Communication integration 
policy should be based on two fundamental underlying principles: First of all that the 
principle of subsidiarity prevails clearly demonstrating that the primary responsibility for the 
elaboration and implementation of integration policies lies with the Member States, and 
secondly, the holistic approach which will ensure integration of immigrants into all aspects of 
society and which requires that a two-way approach - implying that the responsibility for 
integration lies both with the receiving society and with the arriving immigrant - is applied. 
The pilot projects supports networks and the transferral of information and good practices 
between Member States, regional and local authorities and other stakeholders in order to 
facilitate open dialogue and identify priorities for national integration policies and the actions 
also support new innovative projects which promote integration of third-country nationals.  
To continue the encouragement of a more structured policy development in the field of 
integration as initiated by INTI, the financial instrument should be complemented by actions 
facilitating co-operation between Member States and exchange of best practices (Community 
actions). 
The Integration Fund will work in complementarity with the ESF and the ERF. In particular, 
as emphasised above, while the European Social Fund will be directed at supporting specific 
actions to reinforce the social integration of migrants through increasing their access to 
employment especially, the Integration and Refugee Fund will support activities not covered 
by the ESF, such as participation in civic and cultural life and respect for diversity, in the first 
case, and measures addressed to assisting asylum seekers, in the second case. 
3.4 Asylum 
The discussion on the policy options available to achieve solidarity in the field of asylum 
policy was inevitably influenced by the existing financial instrument, the European Refugee 
Fund. At the time of its renewal last year, different options have been considered and will be 
briefly recalled here. Options such as “no policy scenario”, or the simple replacement of the 
ERF I by a non-financial instrument (such as open method of coordination) were rejected, as 
they did not satisfactorily address the requirements of the Treaty regarding burden-sharing. 
The policy options envisaged were therefore all based on the principle of financial support of 
the Community to the Member States.  
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The evaluation of the ERF I raised certain questions in particular with regard to the 
effectiveness and the European added value of the first phase of the European Refugee Fund. 
Therefore, the policy options examined took into account in particular the weaknesses 
identified by the evaluation: 
• the potential added value deriving from the existence of a fund whose coverage is 
restricted to refugees and persons seeking protection is considerable.  
• the evaluation also found that the general level of impact on the national policies in the 
areas of reception, integration and voluntary repatriation, as well as on harmonisation 
among the Member States, remained rather limited. 
• finally, the evaluation also pointed to implementation weaknesses, in particular to what 
was perceived as excessive administration and bureaucracy.  
Four ‘models’ were considered as regards the principle of financial support of the Community 
to Member States.  
Model 1: mainstreaming asylum into other Community instruments  
The first model considered was to abandon the European Refugee Fund as a separate financial 
solidarity initiative, and mainstreaming measures aimed at refugees and asylum seekers into 
other Community instruments. The advantages would lie in the existence of an integrated 
treatment of the target population through a single instrument, and a “guichet unique”. 
However, the role of such an instrument as an accompanying measure to the progressive 
implementation of a Common Asylum Policy (including asylum procedures) would be lost. 
Furthermore, the criteria of expression of “burden” or responsibility in the area of asylum are 
not, in most cases, related to the criteria determining the division of resources between 
Member States and regions within other Community programmes, such as the structural funds 
(relative wealth, in particular). Therefore the relative distribution of funds would not reflect 
adequately the specific needs arising from the uneven distribution of asylum seekers across 
Member States. Finally, essential actions, such as structuring and developing reception 
capability, improvement of asylum procedures and voluntary return schemes (representing 
over 70 % of measures implemented throughout the first phase of the ERF) would not be 
covered in such an option. 
Model 2: a purely redistributive financial instrument  
On the option of the continuation of the European Refugee Fund as a purely redistributive 
financial instrument covering the needs identified and expressed by the Member States it was 
considered that the ERF would mainly act as a redistributive mechanism, based on the number 
of persons within the target group registered or admitted in each Member State. Each Member 
State would then invest the funds in accordance with its identified needs and priorities, based 
purely on national strategy. This option would have the advantage of reflecting closely on the 
reality of needs in the field, and would be easier to manage at Community / Commission 
level. However, the ERF would act as a financial compensation instrument and have little or 
no impact on improvement of coordination and convergence of national policies in the context 
of a Common European Asylum policy. 
Model 3: a completely centralised financial instrument  
In this option the Commission would both identify needs and priorities at a European level, 
select and co finance actions to be supported to encourage actions that correspond to needs at 
 EN 32   EN 
Community level: one could be tempted to refocus completely the financial support towards 
projects with a strong European added value and transnational impact, in order to ensure full 
adequacy of actions supported to the common standards developed. However, this approach 
would prove difficult to manage at EU level due to the level of human resources required and 
would run the risk of a disconnection between objectives and targets set at EU level and the 
actual needs of the target population and actors in the field (governments, NGOs, regional and 
local authorities) in the Member States.  
Model 4: a strategic solidarity instrument  
The last option considered was a more strategic “solidarity” instrument with a reinforced link 
to European asylum policy, and greater cooperation and cross-fertilisation dimension at 
national and European level. This option, which was the one chosen for the ERF II, aimed at 
correcting the weaknesses identified with the first phase of the ERF, building on the 
progressive establishment of a common asylum policy and the common European asylum 
system, and recognising the still wide diversity of asylum systems between Member States. It 
encourages a progressive convergence and consistency not only of legislation, but also of 
material and social conditions for the reception, the integration and the return of asylum 
seekers, refugees and displaced persons. Different parameters were considered in this regard: 
target groups of the ERF (continued relevance, reduction of potential overlaps with other 
Community programmes); implementation structures and management procedures (a more 
efficient cooperation between European and national level, more efficient management and 
better value for money for projects); and increasing the impact of the ERF in all areas covered 
(reception, integration, return) and knowledge sharing at the European level. The resulting 
proposal was considered very relevant at the time, and given the very short time since its 
adoption, the rationale still remains valid.  
The chosen option: a revision of the ERF II Decision  
The above assessment on the different model is valid to date. The current proposal will 
therefore merely extend the programming period of the ERF II until the end of the new 
financial perspectives, i.e. to change its end date from end 2010 to the end of 2013.  
Moreover, to take into account the establishment of the Return Fund, the need for an 
adjustment of the strand on return in the European Refugee Fund was considered necessary.  
Currently, the European Refugee Fund supports actions for the voluntary return of persons 
who have applied for international protection or who are enjoying international protection in 
the Member States. In practice, in terms of returns, this covers a wide spectrum of situations, 
from those who, having been granted refugee status, decide to return to their countries of 
origin to those who decide to return because they have had applications refused and have few 
prospects in the Member State and who, in the absence of alternatives, decide to avail 
themselves of the arrangements for voluntary return (‘rejected asylum seekers’). 
The following options were examined:  
1. To leave the ERF as it is and limit the Return Fund to illegal immigrants;  
2. To exclude all return measures relating to asylum seekers, refugees and other 
beneficiaries of protection from the ERF and to transfer support for such measures to 
the Return Fund;  
 EN 33   EN 
3. To only transfer the support for (voluntary) measures relating to rejected asylum 
seekers to the Return Fund and maintain the support by the ERF for the voluntary 
return of asylum seekers and persons benefiting from international protection  
The third option was the chosen option.  
The first option was rejected because it would run counter to the purpose of the establishment 
of a separate Community instrument on return. Rejected asylum seekers make up a significant 
proportion of potential target populations for return in many Member States. Member States 
face particular problems in returning this group. In many Member States no distinction is 
made between rejected asylum seekers and other persons who are not or no longer authorised 
to stay or reside in the territory of the Member States. Issues of documentation, logistical 
considerations, and the possibility of further protection grounds being raised as well as of 
ensuring that the return complies with international human rights obligations are obstacles to 
progress. Also, if return of numbers of a particular national group is undertaken – and it 
would seem sensible to maintain a case-load specific approach particularly in this area – then 
it may also be necessary to ensure a degree of monitoring of both the return operation itself 
and of the situation and conditions in the country to which the return is being effected. This 
would be best addressed from a Community-wide perspective, i.e. in the framework of 
integrated return action plans, which would cover both voluntary and enforced returns.  
The second option was also rejected. Persons who have yet to receive a decision on their 
asylum application and beneficiaries of international protection (recognised refugees, persons 
under subsidiary protection), who have expressed the will to voluntarily return to their 
country, are not in the same position as persons who have received a final negative decision 
and a decision to leave the territory of the Member State. Those persons have legal options 
which remain open to them and the ERF already provides a potential framework of support 
for their stay. The frameworks which could provide that support could also be used to 
facilitate return if that is a choice an asylum applicant makes while they remain potentially 
eligible for ERF support. 
The arguments for rejecting option 1 therefore also support option 3. Rejected asylum seekers 
are the key target for voluntary and/or forced returns for Member States. ExCom Conclusions 
of 10 October 2003 expressed concern at the difficulties experienced by many countries of 
asylum in different parts of the world in effecting the return of persons found not to be in need 
of international protection which have undermined the integrity of individual asylum systems. 
Phasing returns of persons found not to be in need of international protection – could 
contribute to this and it was recognised that once a person found not to be in need of 
international protection has made an informed decision to return voluntarily then that should 
take place promptly. Such considerations can be taken up in the framework of an integrated 
return approach, given that a planning mechanism on the return of the target group is an 
essential element in integrated return action plans. 
4. WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS LIKELY TO RESULT FROM THE RELEVANT POLICY OPTION 
AND WHO IS AFFECTED? 
4.1 External Borders Fund 
The main impacts of the Externals Borders Fund would be as follows: 
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• Positive impact on administrative systems and infrastructures of Member States, who will 
get more resources and be able to improve coordination and exchanges. On the other hand, 
Member States will have to cofinance the projects; therefore it could lead to an increase in 
Member State’s expenditure. 
• Impacts for public health, public order and security would be direct and positive, thanks to 
the improvement of controls, which will make easier to prevent the entry of persons posing 
a risk from these points of view. Impact on civil society would be indirect but positive 
(better protection against illegal immigration and public security threats) 
• Impacts on the environment would be indirect but possibly negative (more control boats 
and aircrafts, more physical barriers in border zones, etc.), although some positive impacts 
can also be expected: e.g. purchase of less polluting surveillance boats, usage of more 
efficient technologies. Moreover, the use of modern equipment (in place of old equipment) 
and of modern technologies (e.g. mobile surveillance equipment instead of fences) might 
itself have a positive effect on the environment.  
• From the human rights point of view, increasing Member State border control capabilities 
(in particular through surveillance measures) could mean that more people would be 
intercepted, refused entry and/or removed to their countries of origin, where they probably 
face a situation of poverty and lack of freedoms. Increasing controls would make them 
more dissuasive and perhaps discourage some of these people from trying to enter the EU 
illegally though it might equally encourage some to take even greater risks. 
• The risks of fraud could be linked to cases of mismanagement, illicit appropriation or 
corruption, although they not seem to be big as the funds will be managed by Member 
State’s law enforcement agencies. There is also a risk of giving funding to Member States 
that do not really need it (e.g. because of being economically strong) or whose burden is 
lower, especially if objective criteria are not appropriately qualified by risk criteria 
• The smoothing of flows of bona fide travellers would have positive economic impacts for 
business and tourism. 
The financial support under the Fund will be developed in complementarity with the work of 
the FRONTEX Agency.  
The Agency has constituted an important step for promoting solidarity between member 
States in the field of external border management. The Agency has as its objective to facilitate 
and render more effective the application of the Community acquis related to the external 
borders, through coordination but also by providing the necessary technical support and 
expertise. The Fund will be complementary to these efforts. The Fund can provide the 
necessary financial means for the implementation of joint operations and pilot projects, 
whenever the Agency will not undertake to do it by itself under Article 3(4) of the Regulation. 
The Fund will also contribute to the adoption of the necessary measures derived from the risk 
analysis prepared by the Agency, and to the implementation of the common core curriculum 
to be established by it. 
The Agency provides the Commission and the Member States with the necessary technical 
support and facilitates the application of existing and future Community measures on external 
borders. Conversely, this Fund will not support co-operation between Member States in the 
management of their external borders.  
In view of creating a level playing field in terms of information, the Commission shall consult 
the Agency on the preparation of the strategic multiannual guidelines and the draft 
multiannual programmes submitted by the Member States, as well as inform the Agency of 
the annual programmes and the implementation reports submitted by the Member States. 
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Moreover, for the purpose of the mid-term review, the Commission will request the Agency 
to provide input for its assessmenti of the impact of the Fund. 
Complementarity between the Fund and the FRONTEX Agency 
The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders constitutes a first 
and important step for promoting solidarity between Member States in the field of external border management. 
The purpose of the Agency is not, nevertheless, to provide for a comprehensive financial solidarity mechanism 
under which funds would be transferred from the Agency’s budget to Member States. Co-financing of operations 
and projects can take place when they are coordinated by the Agency and the Agency so decides. In addition, 
Member States may cooperate among themselves outside the framework of the Agency on condition that such 
cooperation complements the action of the Agency and the Agency is informed about. The Fund could therefore 
contribute to the funding of operational cooperation activities that are not funded by the Agency. 
Another example how the Agency and the Fund could act in a complementary way is training. The Agency’s 
Regulation lays down that the Agency shall establish and develop a common core curriculum for border guards’ 
training and provide training for national instructors. Although the Agency can also provide other training 
activities, the Agency will not be the main responsible for providing training to national officers, that falls under 
the responsibility of Member States. The Fund could therefore help Member States to implement the common 
core curriculum established by the Agency and to finance further training given in their respective 
administrations by the national instructors trained by the Agency. 
With regard to return cooperation, the Regulation establishing the Agency sets up expressly that the Agency will 
be able to use Community financial means available in the field of return. 
4.2 Return Fund  
General impacts of a more effective return policy 
An effective implementation of the return policy for illegal migrants living in Member States 
would have beneficial effects on the credibility of the EU immigration policy and on social 
cohesion in particular and for the general objective of creating an area of freedom, security 
and justice for EU citizens. It could also, however, have positive economic effects especially 
in the long-term. 
An effective implementation would, therefore: 
• reinforce a managed immigration policy by complementing the control of the EU’s 
external borders and ensuring that those who succeed in entering the Union illegally are 
returned with minimum delay to the countries they came from; 
• help to increase the acceptance of legally staying third-country nationals in Member States 
and, therefore, of diversity, with potential benefits to the competitiveness of the EU 
economy as well as to social cohesion; 
• contribute thereby to increasing employment rates among third-country nationals and, 
therefore, their contribution to economic activity and the generation of real income; 
• facilitate the acceptance of the immigration of workers with the skills required by EU 
economies faced with a prospective natural decline in working-age population and, 
therefore, in the labour force; 
• reduce the costs on national budgets associated with the detention of illegal migrants; 
• give illegally residing third country nationals more opportunity to return and settle in their 
country of origin in a dignified manner instead of having to live on the margins of society 
and very often to work in arduous jobs with poor terms and conditions. 
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Specific impact of the Return Fund 
Action at EU level will have a number of positive effects, including: 
• ensuring the common implementation of effective procedures for the return of illegal 
migrants, which also protect their basic rights and human dignity; 
• promoting the adoption of best practices in this regard as well as with regard to the 
measures taken to provide incentives to the people concerned to return to their country of 
origin voluntarily; 
• encouraging a more intensive exchange of information between Member States on the 
national initiatives developed, the challenges relating to returns and the management of 
complex return processes, as well as the relations with third countries in this regard; 
• enhancing the cost-effectiveness of return measures through joint operations. 
The activities financed under the Return Fund could also benefit the countries of origin of 
returnees. To the extent that these activities include training and other measures designed to 
make it easier for returnees to integrate back into the countries concerned and take up gainful 
employment, they could lead to increased economic activity there. As such, they are 
complimentary to the actions financed under the AENEAS Programme which include more 
structural measures to support the reintegration of returnees on a sustainable basis, especially 
in on countries which have signed readmission agreements with the Community. 
4.3 Integration Fund 
The effects of the Integration Fund have been identified at two levels: firstly, the general 
effects of a greater integration of third country nationals were considered; then, against this 
background, the specific effects of the Fund were discussed, taking into account the 
magnitude of identified needs, and the proposed scale of EU intervention. These specific 
effects will in essence represent the added-value of EU intervention in this field.  
As regards general effects, better integration of migrants is likely to have many positive 
social and economic effects both on migrants themselves and on the host community. The 
potential social effects of integration of immigrants are substantial. If immigrants do not 
participate in cultural, religious, civic and political aspects of society and interact with the 
host community they tend to be seen and act as a separate group excluded from society in 
general. Lack of social integration fosters increased hostility towards immigrants and to ethnic 
minorities in general (leading to the rise of racism and xenophobia). Further integration of 
immigrant populations should lead to a more cohesive and inclusive society overall, where 
differences are respected and the merits of diversity appreciated. Creating a welcoming 
society and strengthening the dialogue between different groups will increase general 
understanding of different cultures, traditions and religions. The improved integration of 
third-country nationals will have a positive economic impact by increasing labour supply and 
thus overcoming shortages in a number of sectors. 
For migrants themselves, greater integration in society and better access to education as well 
as the labour market will improve their well being and increase their self-esteem. Having a 
job and being able to provide for themselves and their families should give them an increased 
feeling of belonging to society and encourage them to engage in community life and social, 
cultural and political activities in general. The integration of women will also indirectly 
benefit future generations, by increasing their chances of integrating into society themselves, 
of gaining a better understanding of the language and of performing better at school. 
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Although it is difficult to point to direct beneficial effects on the environment, there ought to 
be generally positive effects on the educational level of EU society, which should make it a 
better place in which to live, and increased awareness of environmental issues and a wider 
tendency to take action to protect and improve the natural and physical environment. More 
active participation in social and political life at local level is, therefore, likely to be 
accompanied by increased involvement in activities to preserve the local environment and the 
common heritage. 
Against this background, the specific impacts of the Integration Fund have been identified as 
ensuring a strong link with policy developments at EU level, thus supporting the 
implementation of a common immigration policy. In particular, the following impacts should 
be expected: 
• Create a level playing field in terms of integrating third-country nationals across the 
Member States. This requires a catch-up process in those countries of recent immigration, 
where integration policies are only developing. 
• In these countries, the Fund will also act as a catalyst, increasing government expenditure 
on integration of third-country nationals, and thus contributing to the consolidation of a 
true integration system. 
• Strengthening of integration systems will also take place through investments in human 
resources and upgrading of skills, as well as improved coordination and dialogue between 
all relevant stakeholders (national and regional authorities, civil society, etc.). 
• For those Member States with a history of immigration and integration of third-country 
nationals, the Fund will contribute towards a fine-tuning of existing policies, focussing on 
identified shortcomings, and thus increasing their overall effectiveness. 
4.4 European Refugee Fund  
The main impacts of the ERF have been analysed according to its target groups as follows: 
• for final beneficiaries (asylum seekers and refugees): improvements in reception conditions 
(quality / quantity of material reception conditions such as health, housing, education, 
social benefits, access to the labour market), and fairer and more effective asylum 
procedures; easier integration by a decrease in dependence on social welfare, improved 
access to the labour market, and thus increased participation in social life through civil 
society organisations and other relevant channels; 
• for Member States, the ERF contributes to the economic responsibility undertaken by the 
Member State in relation to the reception of asylum seekers and refugees and 
implementation of a common asylum policy; it also supports changes in processes / 
policies by development of higher standards, fairer and more effective asylum procedures, 
reduction of the length of asylum procedures, capacity-building, improvement of 
qualification of staff, exchanges of experiences and best practices at EU level. 
• for partners of asylum policy (NGO, Refugee Community Organisations, local and 
regional authorities): capacity building and development of new services and greater 
involvement of self-help organisations; improvement of qualification of staff, increased 
cooperation of services / structures in developing capacity in the area of reception. 
• for EU citizens in general: awareness raising on the issue of refugees and asylum seekers 
and better acceptance of reception centres by local communities. 
The potential impacts of the ERF II were screened and assessed for all measures, and it can be 
said that positive impacts outweigh negative impacts, in particularly as regards social impacts. 
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A redistributive analysis has shown that the target group who benefits most directly is that of 
asylum seekers and refugees. Most importantly, significant important systemic effects have 
been identified with regard to the Member States and the organisations working in this area 
(NGOs and Refugee Community organisations). It must be noted that the situation varies 
from country to country, most notably in terms of the degree of consolidation of the asylum 
systems and the experience with the different strands of the programme. 
When the types of impact were considered, the most significant were in the social sphere - 
economic impacts were more indirect and more difficult to identify given the scale of the 
Fund. Direct implementation costs have not been quantified and are being addressed in the 
framework of the monitoring system of the Fund. Indirect and associated costs are more 
difficult to assess. Environmental impacts have been found to be quite weak, and it has not 
been possible to differentiate these impacts by target group. 
Identified impacts on countries of origin presented a somewhat ambiguous picture – if it was 
clear that a better management of asylum flows can have positive impacts in the development 
of these countries, associated risks have been identified. These included, for example, risks of 
asylum seekers and refugees losing contact with their countries of origin, and also risks of 
qualified people leaving these countries (brain drain). 
To conclude, it can be said that, overall, expected impacts were coherent with the formulation 
of the main objectives of the Fund. Indeed, the overall impacts reflected the main policy goal 
of the ERF, i.e. the contribution to the implementation of the common asylum standards and 
guidelines agreed at EU level and convergence of practices across Member States to support 
an open and secure European Union, fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva 
Convention and other relevant human rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian 
needs on the basis of solidarity. 
5. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND RELEVANT 
EXPERTS 
5.1 External borders  
Already in May 2002 the European Commission, in its Communication "Towards an 
integrated management of the external borders of Member States" devoted a chapter to burden 
sharing and to the need of establishing a mechanism based on the Community budget, for 
organising a distribution of the financial burden between Member States and for the purchase 
of common equipment for joint operations. 
In June 2002 the JAI Council adopted the Plan for the management of the external borders of 
Member States. One of its chapters laid down the conditions for the establishment of a burden 
sharing mechanism between Member States and the execution of a study on possible options 
for a co-financing from the Community budget. On the same month, the European Council of 
Sevilla requested the Commission to present such study to the Council before June 2003. 
The need for a solidarity mechanism regarding the control of the external borders has been 
recognised at the highest political level. The Hague programme underlines “the need for 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility including its financial implications between the 
Member States”. The Council and the Commission are invited in particular to establish a 
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Community border management fund by the end of 2006 at the latest”, “in order to support 
Member States with specific requirements for control and surveillance of long or difficult 
stretches of external borders, and where Member States are confronted with special and 
unforeseen circumstances due to exceptional migratory pressures on these borders”. 
Member States were first consulted on July 2002 on the basis of a questionnaire, followed by 
an expert meeting on April 2003 with a view of establishing a series of homogeneous and 
agreed data that could be the basis for a feasibility study. Meetings were also held with 
experts from Member States in December 2004 and February 2005 on the basis of discussion 
papers of the Commission services. Member States had the opportunity to provide 
observations in writing.  
The Commission services also consulted IOM and UNHCR. 
5.2 Return  
The Commission initially introduced the idea of the possible creation of a specific financial 
instrument for return purposes in its Communication on a policy on illegal immigration of 15 
November 2001 and elaborated this idea in the Green Paper on a Community return policy on 
illegal residents of 10 April 2002. In this context a public hearing took place in July 2002. The 
Council (Justice and Home Affairs) as well as the European Council discussed this item 
several times in 2002, 2003 and 2004.  
Meetings with experts from Member States were held in December 2004 and February 2005 
on the basis of discussion papers of the Commission services. In addition, a special work shop 
was held with the Member States to collect and analyse information relating to the size of the 
target population and the cost of return management.  
The Commission services also had meetings with IOM and UNHCR representatives in 
January and February 2005. 
5.3 Integration  
The idea of creating an Integration Fund stems first and foremost from Commissioner 
Vitorino, influenced by the fact that the INTI projects have been very successful and that 
some Member States continuously called for Community Funding in this area with a view of 
taking a balanced approach to immigration.  
During the Dutch Presidency an inter-ministerial conference on Integration was held in 
Groningen in November 2004 and for the first time ministers responsible for integration 
gathered to discuss introduction of newly arrived immigrants and fight against radicalisation. 
The conference conclusions called for more structural exchange of information at EU level in 
line with the newly adopted Hague Programme, and at the conference Commissioner Vitorino 
publicly announced his intensions of setting up an Integration Fund. The idea of the Fund was 
intensively discussed as well as the optimal use of current funds although no agreement was 
reached. Following the discussions Commissioner Vitorino promised the ministers 
responsible for integration that Member States would be fully consulted in the process of 
developing the Fund.  
Consequently, the Commission chose to use the Network of National Contact Points on 
Integration for these consultations. The network consists of governmental experts with a 
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special expertise in the field of integration. Consultations took place on the basis of a 
discussion paper laying out the overall objectives for the Integration Fund as well as a paper 
providing a preliminary assessment of the new instruments impact. In preparation of the 
papers the network has been asked to provide information about the expenditure of national 
funds in the field of integration of immigrants. The consultations have taken place over two 
half-day meetings in December 2004 and January 2005.  
The Commission services also consulted IOM and UNHCR. . 
5.4 Asylum 
A wide consultation was carried out for the preparation of the proposal for the second phase 
of the European Refugee Fund in 2004, including: 
• a survey of all Member States national authorities as well as all projects supported between 
2000 and 2002 (response rate of projects was 43 %), carried out within the framework of 
the mid-term evaluation of the first phase of the European Refugee Fund (January to 
November 2003) ; 
• a conference organised by the European Commission on 30-31 October 2003, which 
attracted over 350 participants from 15 Member States and 10 acceding countries, 
representing all partners involved in the implementation of asylum policy (national 
government representatives, regional and local authorities, NGOs, Refugee Community 
Organisations. This Conference, whilst presenting the first results of the mid-term 
evaluation of the first phase of the European Refugee Fund, was an opportunity to gather 
opinions and proposals for the second phase of the instrument. The debates were organised 
around five workshops, focusing on new developments and needs in the three fields of 
intervention of the European Refugee Fund (reception, integration and return), and 
“horizontal” themes (development of best practices, the added value of transnationality, 
definition and expression of solidarity in the area of asylum policy). 
• a specific questionnaire on some of the questions raised by the mid-term evaluation and 
options envisaged through the conference was sent to a very large number of Organisations 
and to all Member States’ responsible Authorities involved with the first phase of the ERF. 
The results of these consultations were the following: 
• The overall validation of the criteria used for the expression of solidarity needs to take into 
account criteria linked to the relative responsibility undertaken by each Member State 
(GDP), and to the short term specific needs of the 10 acceding countries with regard to 
structural development of their asylum systems; 
• The need to strengthen the European dimension of the ERF, both in terms of objectives and 
operations; 
• The ERF should receive substantially increased financial resources in order to have a 
substantially greater impact on structures, processes and policies, in particular given the 
increased need to transpose and adopt new EC legislation in the field of asylum; 
• The ERF should be driven by the principle of additionality to, strengthen capacity and 
encourage innovation; 
• Need for increased dialogue both at national and transnational level between all actors 
involved; 
• Multi-annual programming periods and multi-annual project duration; 
• A simplified and proportionate management and control system. 
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These conclusions were integrated in the legal basis for the ERF II, which will now be 
extended to cover the full period under the new financial perspectives.  
The Commission services informed Member States at the meeting in February of the possible 
approach to the revision of the ERF within the framework of the action programme 
‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’. Here, the Commission services also 
consulted IOM and UNHCR.  
6. HOW TO ACHIEVE COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN THE CHOSEN POLICY OPTION 
(COMMUNITY FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT)? 
The various strands of the Solidarity programme proposed for tackling the different aspects of 
the management of immigration across the EU have in common the establishment of a 
financial instrument for supporting actions at EU and Member State level while at the same 
time promoting cooperation between Member States, the coordination of activities and the 
exchange of information and best practice. This combination of actions is designed to pursue 
EU common interests in the different areas concerned – in the control of external borders, in 
the management of asylum and return policy and in the integration of legally staying third 
country nationals into EU societies – while simultaneously sharing the cost involved more 
equitably between Member States. It is also designed to pursue both objectives in the most 
cost effective way. 
6.1 External borders Fund  
Without such burden sharing, the cost of putting in place an effective system for controlling 
the EU’s external borders in particular would fall disproportionately on a limited number of 
Member States which happen to have borders with third countries. These Member States for 
the most part have relatively low levels of GDP per head and so have limited resources for 
meeting the common EU objective of securing external borders against illegal entry. In the 
absence of financial support, therefore, it is likely that they will be unable to carry out the 
expenditure required to achieve the level of control required or, if they do undertake the 
necessary level of spending, that this will adversely affect their ability to achieve other 
objectives (such as tackling problems of lagging economic development). 
The difficulty is in assessing the level of financial support which should be provided. This 
depends, on the one hand, on the scale of expenditure required to put in place the border 
controls considered necessary and, on the other, the proportion of this expenditure which it is 
regarded as appropriate in the interests of solidarity to cover. The latter is largely a political 
decision, though if it is set too low, then the danger is that the support provided will not be 
sufficient to fund the expenditure necessary and controls will be less effective than Member 
States jointly wish them to be. On the other hand, if it is set too high then there is an increased 
possibility of wasting resources, of devoting excessive expenditure to this objective in relation 
to the benefits achieved or of reducing the incentive to ensure that resources are used in the 
most efficient or cost effective way. The challenge is to avoid both potential outcomes.  
Striking the right balance in determining both the scale of the fund which should be created 
for this purpose and the way it should be allocated between Member States is made difficult 
by the lack of data on both the current level of spending on external border controls in 
Member States and the desired level. Moreover, where data do exist, it is often unclear what 
they cover, which means that it difficult – and hazardous – to compare expenditure across 
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Member States. This difficulty is all the more serious given the very different conditions and 
circumstances surrounding the control of external borders in different parts of the EU and, 
accordingly, the differential costs involved. 
Although some effort has been made to collect the necessary data on expenditure on border 
controls from Member States, this has not been particularly successful. In most cases, the data 
received are incomplete, not sufficiently detailed to assess spending in respect of particular 
borders and not directly comparable across countries. Nevertheless, they indicate broad orders 
of magnitude of the amounts involved.  
They show, for example, an annual level of spending on infrastructure and equipment 
(including means of transport as well as monitoring and detection devices), directly related to 
border controls and surveillance, of around € 130 million a year in Spain and € 160 million in 
Greece, figures which are somewhat higher than for other countries for which data are 
available. In Poland, where equipment which meets EU standards is in the process of being 
installed, they indicate average expenditure of € 115 million in the three years 2003 to 2005 
on these items, with a further € 30 million a year spent on training of personnel. (These 
figures, it should be noted, exclude wages and salaries and other operating costs, which it is 
not intended to include in the criteria for allocating financial support.) These figures are meant 
as illustration only, as available date render impossible to estimate overall expenditure on the 
items covered in the EU Member States.  
Nevertheless, on the basis of these examples, it can be said that the proposed fund (which 
builds up to € 570 million a year by the end of the next programming period and averages 
around € 300 million a year over the period as a whole, both figures at 2004 prices), 
represents a significant amount – even if not all will be allocated to supporting expenditure in 
Member States. While it would leave a substantial proportion of spending overall to be met by 
national resources, it ought to be large enough to exert a significant influence on both the 
level and types of expenditure. 
Accordingly, the fund should be capable of playing an important role as a solidarity 
mechanism and as essential support for cooperation between Member States of various kinds, 
including the exchange of information and best practice. These latter activities, moreover, by 
providing access to details of the latest techniques and technology as well as by encouraging 
innovative approaches to border management, should serve to reduce the costs involved in 
achieving a given standard in the operation of controls and surveillance, while at the same 
time helping to increase their effectiveness. 
Similar arguments apply to other strands of the solidarity programme. In each case, it is 
proposed to establish, or to strengthen, a financial mechanism both to demonstrate solidarity 
between Member States in undertaking activities of EU interest and to underpin cooperation, 
exchange and coordinated action across the Union in pursuit of common objectives. Although 
clearly it would be more cost effective to rely on Member States acting voluntarily in this 
regard, experience has shown the limitations of voluntary action. In respect of the 
management of asylum-seekers and returns, the potential gains from coordinated action, joint 
operations and the regular and systematic exchange of information are substantial, in terms of 
both the sharing of costs and the development of more effective procedures and arrangements. 
By the same token, the costs of non-cooperation, or at least of limited cooperation, are equally 
large.  
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A main function of the proposed funds is, therefore, to stimulate cooperation and so enable 
the potential benefits to be realised, while at the same time supporting action at EU level 
designed to develop innovative methods and so increase the efficiency of operations. A major 
objective, allied with that of burden sharing and of ensuring universal respect for the rights of 
those seeking to reside in EU Member States, is accordingly to improve the cost effectiveness 
of expenditure in this area. 
6.2 Return Fund 
As regards the return of those not entitled to reside in EU Member States, the data collected 
from countries are again not entirely satisfactory but they are indicative of the cost involved. 
As stated on section 1, they show that the average cost of return, including only the cost of 
arranging transport for returnees back to their countries of origin, together with their escorts, 
amounts to around € 1.000 per person returning in most Member States. On present levels of 
return, this would imply a total cost on this item alone of over € 200 million in the EU as a 
whole. The overall cost of return operations, including the cost of detention and of other 
activities, undertaken both in EU Member States and in third countries, is clearly several 
times higher than this. 
Cooperation and coordinated action between Member States is capable of reducing this figure 
substantially. The possibility of sharing the costs of transportation alone can achieve a 
significant saving in cost, in terms of sharing a plane and escorts, given that returnees from 
different EU Member States are often being sent back to the same countries (A Member State 
quoted an example of a charter flight carrying returnees back to an African country, where the 
average cost per person was reduced from € 8.438 to € 6.900, a reduction of 18%, simply by 
using the same flight to transport two returnees from two other Member States along with 16 
from the Member State concerned). To this can be added the savings in the expenditure of 
organising joint trips to third countries to negotiate returns and related purposes. 
Additional cost savings are also potentially to be achieved through the exchange of 
information and experience in managing returns, which can lead to more efficient 
arrangements being put in place. Greater efficiency in this area stands not only to reduce 
overall costs per person returning but equally importantly to enable the number involved to be 
increased, so saving on the costs of detention as well as raising the effectiveness of policy in 
this area generally, with potential gains to community relations and social cohesion. 
The financial instrument proposed for supporting the return activities of Member States 
(averaging € 100 million at current prices and rising to about € 200 million in 2013) is 
significant in relation to overall spending, even given an increase in the number of people 
returning. It should provide substantial support to the development of more effective policies 
in this area, which partly means encouraging more voluntary returns – which are not only 
desirable in themselves but which involve lower costs – and partly greater cooperation and 
coordination of activities between Member States. 
6.3 Integration Fund 
Integrating migrants fully into society can produce considerable returns in economic as well 
as social terms, if by so doing more of them are able not only to find employment but jobs 
which are more suited to their skills and capabilities and in which they are, therefore, more 
productive and contribute more to value-added. The social benefits in terms of better 
community relations and increased social cohesion are no less important. Introductory 
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programmes, teaching newly-arrived migrants basic language skills and basic facts about their 
new country, are an essential preparation in very many cases for their entry into the labour 
market and for them to be able both to look for suitable jobs and to participate in training 
measures. Equally, programmes on the history, culture and politics of the society in which 
they live are an important means of migrants integrating into the social and cultural life of the 
country, which can also contribute to their economic integration. 
Expenditure on integration programmes varies markedly between Member States, because of 
differences partly in the number of migrants they have to integrate, partly in the resources 
they available – ie their GDP per head, but more importantly because of differences in the 
priority attached to integration. In a number of Member States, therefore, especially in the 
south of the Union, immigration on a substantial scale is a relatively recent phenomenon and 
integration has only recently come to be seen as a major policy issue. In consequence, 
although integration programmes for newly-arrived migrants exist in all Member States, in 
many the proportion of such people participating in these programmes is relatively small. In 
Spain, for example, the number of participants in integration programmes designed to 
introduce newcomers to life in the country and to provide basic tuition in the language totalled 
some 19.400 in 2003, according to the data collected as part of the preparation of this 
assessment, whereas the number granted long-term residence visas in the same year was 
almost 172.000. The programme, therefore, covered only some 11% of the target group. 
Although coverage of such programmes in a number of other countries is higher, especially in 
the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, it is lower still in many of the new Member States, 
where integration programmes are also only just being developed, or in some cases, being 
thought about. Average participation in the EU as a whole may, therefore, be only around 
15% or so (because only some Member States have provided data on this in response to 
requests, this figure is inevitably uncertain). The objective is to achieve a coverage of 30% 
across the EU by the end of the 2006-2013 period, which means doubling the coverage and, 
given the likely increase in immigration, more than doubling the number of participants. The 
size of the fund proposed has been determined in line with this objective. 
The data collected from Member States also indicate that the average amount spent per 
participant on integration programmes (covering introductory courses and basic language 
tuition but not labour market training or income support) was around € 1800-2000 in EU-15 
countries in 2003 (in some countries, like Spain, slightly lower – and in the new Member 
States, much lower – in others, like the Netherlands or Denmark, slightly higher). Given the 
objective of reaching 30% of newly-arrived migrants from third countries and given an 
estimated 1 million or more people arriving each year, this implies a target of covering over 
300.000 people by 2013 instead of the estimated 150.000 at present. To achieve this would 
require additional expenditure of some € 300 million on the basis of the present average cost 
estimate. A proposed EU contribution from the fund of 50% to Member States to meet the 
objective (75% for the new Member States), therefore, implies total spending for this item 
alone of € 150 million in 2013.  
Added to this is financial support to contribute to the social and cultural integration of third 
country migrants who have been living in the EU for some time, which is an equally 
important objective. According to the latest data, these total just over 14 million in the EU as 
a whole. To achieve the objective set of reaching just 5% of these people over the next 
programming period as a whole (ie 700.000) and given average expenditure per participant of 
around the same as for newly-arrived migrants, would imply total expenditure of some € 1,4 
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billion over period or an EU contribution of around € 100 million a year, given a co-payment 
rate of 50%.  
The two figures together, therefore, imply total support to Member States for integration 
programmes of € 250 million, which together with support for other activities, in particular 
support for civil society (NGOs representing the interests of third country migrants) and 
awareness-raising campaigns, especially among the host population, justifies the total fund 
proposed of at least € 400 million in 2013. 
A fund of this size is calculated not only to contribute significantly to the cost of expanded 
integration programmes in Member States but also to draw attention – especially in countries 
where these at present are a low priority – to the importance of integration programmes and to 
the social and economic benefits which they are capable of producing. These benefits stand to 
be considerable not only for the Member States most concerned but also for the EU as a 
whole. 
6.4 Asylum Fund 
The data collected from Member States on the cost of systems for managing asylum-seekers 
indicates that this can be substantial (in Germany, for example, total annual expenditure was 
estimated at around € 1,5 billion in 2002). The proposed fund, therefore, only amounts to a 
small proportion of overall spending in Member States (possibly only around 2-3%), though a 
much higher proportion of expenditure excluding the social support of the people concerned. 
Nevertheless, the sum involved ought to be sufficient (an average of around € 170 million a 
year) to serve as a catalyst to improve asylum systems and to encourage cooperation between 
Member States and the exchange of information and good practice. If it were any lower, 
however, there is a distinct possibility that it would be ignored by Member States and would 
not have the effect in stimulating more efficient operations in this area which is desired. 
7. HOW TO ACHIEVE ADDED VALUE IN THE CHOSEN OPTION (COMMUNITY FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENT)? 
7.1 How added value is achieved in the framework programme 
Programmes in the JLS area, and the measures which they include, are aimed at pursuing a 
common EU interest, the common goal of establishing an area of freedom, security and 
justice where basic human rights are respected. Each of the programmes is designed to 
address particular aspects which are a critical part of the creation of such an area in the EU, 
given the integration of national economies and the goal of ensuring free movement of people 
as well as goods, services and capital between countries. As such, they tackle issues affecting 
freedom, security and justice which arise from the creation of economic and monetary union 
and the abolition of internal borders and which can only be effectively addressed at EU level. 
These issues are to do with cooperation, harmonisation, coordination of activities, the 
exchange and sharing of critical information and best practices and techniques, and 
establishing solidarity mechanisms for sharing the costs involved in pursuing common and 
agreed objectives in an equitable way. 
They are reflected in the objectives set out in the Hague Programme adopted by the European 
Council in November 2004, which include: guarantying fundamental human rights throughout 
the EU, establishing minimum procedural safeguards and common access to justice, 
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extending the mutual recognition of judicial decisions, fighting organised cross-border crime 
and the threat of terrorism, ensuring protection in accordance with international treaties to 
those in need, and regulating migration flows and controlling the external borders of the EU.  
The activities under the Solidarity programme, therefore, are aimed at pursuing common EU 
interests relating to the regulation of migration flows, the management of those seeking 
asylum in Member States as well as the return of people not entitled to stay, and the 
integration of migrants into EU society. The financial instruments set up to support these 
activities are designed to pursue these common interests and so generate added-value at EU 
level in the most efficient way. 
More specifically, financial support for external border controls is intended to ensure both that 
entry into the EU is effectively and efficiently regulated, including in countries which may 
lack the resources to put in place the controls required, and that the necessary funding is more 
equitably shared between all Member States. Member States, therefore, gain collectively in 
terms of being able to enjoy greater security, a reduced incidence of illegal entry and a 
facilitation of the freedom of movement across internal borders, as compared with a situation 
in which each individually is left to determine – and fund – the controls which they 
implement. Moreover, the increased level of consular cooperation and exchange of 
information and best practice which the financial instrument makes possible should reduce the 
costs of achieving a given level of security at the external borders. . 
In the same way, financial support for the management of asylum systems is designed both to 
improve the procedures and arrangements in operation across Member States by encouraging 
actions to improve reception, the integration of refugees and the voluntary return, as well as to 
increase cooperation in the form of exchange of information and best practice aIntegrated 
return management is intended to realise the same kinds of benefit through supporting 
coordinated and collective action in relation to the return of those found to be residing 
illegally in EU Member States. Specifically, therefore, there are common gains to be made by 
Member States from sharing information about the countries to which those not entitled to 
live in the EU need to return, from organising joint travel arrangements and from exchanging 
experience on the measures taken in respect of return procedures.  
Financial support for integration complements the above three funding instruments. In an area 
without internal borders where people are de facto free to move from one country to another 
without hindrance, the effective integration of migrants should be a common concern of all 
Member States, irrespective of how many they have living within their borders. This is not 
only because of the need to ensure that the fundamental rights of migrants as well as EU 
citizens are fully respected. It is also because there is a collective EU interest in a high level of 
social cohesion being achieved across the Union and in the ability of the people concerned to 
contribute fully both to society, in all its dimensions, and to the economy. Integration is key to 
migrants being able to contribute in this way and so enhance the society in which they live 
and add to EU value-added. Integration, therefore, is an essential part of a managed 
immigration policy, a major purpose of which is to raise the potential of the EU society and 
economy and to minimise the effects of the prospective natural decline in population implies.  
7.2 Complementarity with the other framework programmes in the JLS area 
Each of the programmes in the JLS area is aimed at pursuing the objectives set out in the 
Hague Programme in a complementary way without duplicating activities. The activities 
under the Solidarity programme are, therefore, aimed at supporting the freedom of people to 
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move within the EU by regulating migration flows and controlling external border. This 
general objective and the means of achieving it are complementary to activities under the 
other two programmes, and in particular, it is directly complementary to the measures under 
the Justice programme to further fundamental human rights and active citizenship, including 
the fight against racism and xenophobia and the protection of victims of violence. Indeed, the 
management of migration flows and the control of external borders is a key part of 
establishing an area of freedom, security and justice, and, more particularly, of maintaining 
social cohesion and ensuring good community relations. Insofar as the influx of illegal 
immigrants can sour these relations and make it more difficult to establish acceptance of 
cultural and religious diversity among the host population, the development of an effective 
policy on the return of illegal immigrants can contribute further to achieving this objective 
They are also complementary, with activities under the Security programme to prevent and 
fight crime, including the trafficking of people, and to increase information exchange law 
enforcement authorities. Freedom of movement within the EU is contingent on a feeling of 
security and of being adequately protected against criminal activity or terrorist attack. This 
should not be for EU citizens alone but should encompass everyone living in the EU, 
including migrants and refugees. 
8. MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
8.1 Evaluations  
In 2006 there will be studies carried out to assess the state of play with respect to integration, 
return and external borders and to establish the base line situation at the time of the entry into 
force of the Action Programme on 1-1-2007. Moreover, it could be envisaged to carry out a 
survey (EUROBAROMETER) on the then perception by the public at large in MS on the 
state of play with respect to common policies on borders, integration and return.  
For integration, this information will be completed with an evaluation of the INTI preparatory 
actions.  
For return, the information will be completed with an evaluation of the RETURN preparatory 
actions in 2007. The Return Fund will only be operational as of 2008, in order to take into 
account the results of the preparatory actions.  
8.2 Possible indicators for the three new Funds 
External borders Fund 
• Consequences on the size and nature of the expenditure  
• Impact on government policies and action plans (integrated border management)  
• Impact of actions on the perception host population  
• Consequences on the size and nature of the cooperation measures initiated (under objective 
4: activities of consular services abroad) 
• Impact of actions on the perception of governmental actors regarding the belief in 
solidarity  
Return Fund  
• Number of immigrants reached (having been beneficiary of measures financed) 
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• Impact on government policies and action plans (integrated return management)  
• Impact of actions on the perception of target population (migrant organisations) 
• Impact of actions on the perception host population  
• Impact of actions on the perception of governmental actors regarding the belief in 
solidarity  
• Consequences on the size and nature of the cooperation measures initiated  
Integration Fund 
Currently commonly agreed indicators and evaluations mechanism for integration efforts do 
not exist at EU level.  
The Hague Programme and Common basic principles on integration foresee the development 
of evaluation mechanisms, indicators and clear goals in order to learn from experiences and to 
avoid possible failures of the past and adjust policies accordingly. The Commission will take 
the necessary steps to facilitate this evaluation which will enable us to evaluate throughout in 
the future to evaluate activities undertaken by Member States in respect to the fund.  
Based on a study commissioned in 2003 by the Commission on benchmarking in immigrant 
integration, written by Professor Han Entzinger
21
 it is clear that the existence of common 
indicators would make it possible for policy makers at both the European and the national 
level, to draw comparisons between the ways in which the various Member States are 
handling issues related to migrant integration. According to the study is simply impossible to 
develop indicators aiming at setting a standard for an ‘ideal’ integration process of 
immigrants, given the wide variety of factors influencing immigration and integration, the 
immense diversity of migrants and the huge differences in approach of these matters across 
the EU. The study however in fact identifies 4 sets of possible indicators, and concludes that 
benchmarking in integration is possible, but only in a modest way and not without 
considerable obstacles on an EU wide basis.  
The following basic indicators are suggested:  
• Socio-economic integration (such as income level, social security, level of education, 
housing and segregation)  
• Cultural integration (such as attitude towards basic rules and norms of the host country, 
frequency of contacts with host country and country of origin, language skills)  
• Legal and political integration (such as numbers of migrants naturalised annually or who 
obtain a secure residence status, numbers of migrants with dual citizenship, participation in 
politics and participation in civil society) 
• Attitudes of recipient countries (such as reported cases of discrimination, perceptions of 
migrants by the host society, incidence and effects of diversity policies and role of the 
media)  
It is emphasized that these indicators include both so called objective and subjective 
indicators. Objective indicators are concerned largely to measure tangible aspects of the 
integration process. While they provide an insight into social integration they do not 
necessarily measure this as such. Social inclusion, therefore, as measured by these indicators 
                                                 
21
 It is available from the JLS website :  
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/immigration/studies/docs/benchmarking_final_en.p
df 
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is not the same as social integration which involves less tangible and more subjective 
considerations. Having a job, accommodation, access to health care, an income above the 
poverty line and so on are important for migrants to be able to participate in society but in 
themselves, they do not necessarily imply that they are integrated.  
Objective indicators must therefore be supplemented by subjective indicators which convey 
the way people feel about their place in society. Such subjective indicators, moreover, need to 
encompass not only the views and feelings of the migrant population but also those of 
nationals, since integration is a two-way process which requires acceptance by the host 
country population of the presence of migrants and an understanding of their culture, religion 
and traditions as much as specific measures directed at migrants themselves. 
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ANNEX 
Overview of figures relating to the management of external borders and the implementation asylum and 
immigration policies  
I.  EXTERNAL BORDERS  
Table 1  –  External borders: length and number of border crossing points  
Current Schengen area (EU Member States only) (taking into account the participation of Norway and Iceland) 
Table 2  – External borders: length and number of border crossing points  
Current Schengen area (EU Member States only) + new Member States (taking into account the participation of 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) 
Table 3  – Temporary and future external borders  
New Member States acceded to the Union in 2004  
Table 4 – Third country nationals refused entry at external borders  
Number of persons not covered by Community law who are refused entry at the border owing to a lack of, or 
counterfeit, falsified, border documents, an existing entry or residence prohibition or other grounds for refusal. 
Source: Eurostat    
Table 5  – Visa 
Number of consular posts, visa applications and visas issued  
Source: Member States 
II. RETURN 
Table 6  – Removed third country nationals  
Number of persons other than those entitled under Community law who, having entered the country illegally, 
having resided in the country illegally or for other reasons, are returned to a third country, The figures may 
include voluntary departure wheres such a departure takes place in order to comply with a formal order to 
leave. Source: Eurostat  
Table 7  – Return decisions  
Number of return decisions – administrative or judicial decision or act, stating or declaring the illegality of stay 
of a third country national and imposing an obligation to leave the territory of the Member State concerned 
Source: Member States 
 Table 8 – Voluntary and enforced returns of third country nationals illegally staying in the EU  
Source: Member States 
 EN 51   EN 
III. INTEGRATION 
Table 9 – Reported resident population at 1 January 2003 and Eurostat estimates for selected citizenship 
groups   
Number of national residing in Member States, the number of EU nationals resident in another EU Member 
State and the number of Non-EU25 nationals resident in Member States; reported numbers and estimates  
Source: Eurostat  
IV. ASYLUM 
Table 10 – Asylum applications  
Source: Eurostat.   
Table 11- Positive decisions on asylum applications 
The number of third country nationals or stateless persons having the status defined in the Geneva Convention of 
28 July 1951 relating to the status of Refugees and the 1967 protocol thereto and who are permitted to reside as 
refugees in one of the Member States and the number of third country nationals or stateless persons enjoying a 
form of subsidiary protection.  Source: Eurostat 
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I EXTERNAL BORDERS 
Table 1: Schengen area (EU Member States only) (taking into account participation of 
Norway and Iceland) 
Member State Ext. Land Borders Sea Borders Air Borders 
Portugal 0 Km / 0 BCP 2148 Km / 24 BCP 8 BCP 
Spain 88 Km / 4 BCP 7785 Km / 31 BCP 30 BCP 
France 550 Km / 7 BCP 5500 km / 77 BCP 109 BCP 
Belgium 0 Km / 1 BCP 66,5 Km / 5 BCP 6 BCP 
Luxembourg 0 Km / 0 BCP 0 Km / 0 BCP 1 BCP 
Netherlands 0 Km / 0 BCP 451 Km / 12 BCP 9 BCP 
Germany 1675 Km / 165 BCP 3338 Km / 115 BCP 134 BCP 
Italy 970 Km / 84 BCP 7996 Km / 108 BCP 53 BCP 
Austria 1259 Km / 41 BCP 0 Km / 0 BCP 5 BCP 
Greece 1248 Km / 13 BCP 16000 Km / 52 BCP 23 BCP 
Denmark 0 Km / 0 BCP 7300 Km / 104 BCP 2 BCP 
Sweden 0 Km / 0 BCP 2700 Km / 51 BCP 23 BCP 
Finland 1324 Km / 23 BCP 1250 Km / 64 BCP 26 BCP 
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Table 2: Schengen area (EU Member States only) + new Member States – borders + 
border crossing points (assuming Schengen participation of Norway, Iceland and 
Switzerland) 
Member State Ext. Land Borders Sea Borders Air Borders 
Portugal 0 Km / 0 BCP 2148 Km / 24 BCP 8 BCP 
Spain 88 Km / 4 BCP 7785 Km / 31 BCP 30 BCP 
France 56,6 Km / 1 BCP 5500 km / 77 BCP 109 BCP 
Belgium 0 Km / 1 BCP 66,5 Km / 5 BCP 6 BCP 
Luxembourg 0 Km / 0 BCP 0 Km / 0 BCP 1 BCP 
Netherlands 0 Km / 0 BCP 451 Km / 12 BCP 9 BCP 
Germany 0 Km / 0 BCP 3338 Km / 115 BCP 134 BCP 
Italy 0 Km / 0 BCP 7996 Km / 108 BCP 53 BCP 
Austria 0 Km / 1 BCP 0 Km / 0 BCP 5 BCP 
Greece 1248 Km / 13 BCP 16000 Km / 52 BCP 23 BCP 
Denmark 0 Km / 0 BCP 7300 Km / 104 BCP 2 BCP 
Sweden 0 Km / 0 BCP 2700 Km / 51 BCP 23 BCP 
Finland 1324 Km / 23 BCP 1250 Km / 64 BCP 26 BCP 
Estonia 294 Km / 7 BCP 768 Km / 35 BCP 2 BCP 
Latvia 358 Km / 10 BCP 496 Km / 9 BCP 4 BCP 
Lithuania 729 Km / 31 BCP 138 Km / 4 BCP 4 BCP 
Poland 1139 Km / 29 BCP 395 Km / 18 BCP 8 BCP 
Czech 0 Km / 0 BCP 0 Km / 0 BCP 3 BCP 
Hungary 1026 Km / 54 BCP 0 Km / 0 BCP 3 BCP 
Slovakia 97 Km / 3 BCP 0 Km / 0 BCP 3 BCP 
Slovenia 670 Km / 44 BCP 48 Km / 3 BCP 3 BCP 
Malta 0 Km / 0 BCP 253 Km / 3 BCP 1 BCP 
Cyprus 0 Km / 0 BCP 648 Km / 7 BCP 2 BCP 
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Table 3: Borders of the Member States acceded to the European Union not yet 
participating in the area without internal borders   
Member State  Temporary border Future external border
22
 
Estonia  343 Km 339 Km 
Hungary  1140 Km 1104 Km 
 Latvia 931 Km 437 Km 
Poland 1920 Km 1185 Km 
Slovak Republic  1580 Km 97 Km 
Slovenia 662 Km 670 Km 
Czech Republic  1181 Km 0 Km 
Lithuania  692 Km 906 Km 
Cyprus 
23
 0 Km 0 Km 
Malta 0 Km 0 Km 
                                                 
22
 This table does not consider any further enlargement  
23
 This table does not consider the divided line between the two territories 
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Table 4: Total number of refused third country nationals  
   2001 2002 2003 
Belgium 5030 4080 4145 
Czech Republic 39395 33520 31165 
Denmark 2050 485 660 
Germany 48500 45575 42070 
Estonia 3415 3440 3055 
Greece : 17680 17300 
Spain 869.105 1.018.915 706.080 
France 31.165   31.315 
Ireland    
Italy 30265 37185 24005 
Cyprus 5195 4025 3385 
Latvia 705 1085 5150 
Lithuania 3320 3795 5515 
Luxembourg : : : 
Hungary 29775 14450 21265 
Malta 2270 2155 805 
The Netherlands 9280 8420 9380 
Austria 17390 22995 22305 
Poland 50385 47610 44380 
Portugal 2635 4190 3695 
Slovenia 37130 37715 38590 
Slovak Republic 29985 21630 18200 
Finland 3630 3505 2910 
Sweden 2870 1340 1600 
United Kingdom  : : 
Source: Eurostat, CIREFI data collection. These figures have been rounded. Missing data for some or all of the 
period: Greece, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.  
 EN 56   EN 
Table 5: The number of consulates, visa applications and visas issued 
Member State Consulates  Visas issued Visa applications  
Austria 93 420.180 450.000 
Belgium  117 160.220 195.900 
Cyprus 40  145.605 
Czech Republic 112  500.000 
Germany  193 2.495.855 2.864.570 
Denmark 76 80.710 85.550 
Estonia  32 94.950 96.395 
Greece 131 494.300 522.820 
Spain  148 679.475 750.000 
Finland  68 403.180 417.715 
France 213 2.008.800 2.461.830 
Hungary  99  751.515 
Ireland    
Italy  188 874.870 874.870 
Lithuania 40  310.000 
Luxembourg  17 4170 4.710 
Latvia 37 124.010 126.605 
Malta 18 7.665 9.200 
Netherlands 152 318.650 356.965 
Poland 150 415.765 418.235 
Portugal 112 80.880 91.615 
Sweden 75 125.180 149.470 
Slovenia 42 121.650 127.430 
Slovak Republic  69  123.035 
United Kingdom     
Source: Member States  
The figures for visa applications are based on administrative data for a given year. They have been rounded.  
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II.  RETURN  
Table 6: The number of removed third country nationals 
  2001 2002 2003 
Belgium 9110 10350 9995 
Czech Republic 6375 4875 2600 
Denmark 3060 1625 3100 
Germany 36295 31310 30175 
Estonia 315 255 170 
Greece 201960 45300 40930 
Spain 25000 26255 26755 
France 14340 10015 11690 
Ireland : : : 
Italy 32000 33290 31015 
Cyprus 3205 2930 3305 
Latvia 205 195 375 
Lithuania 500 485 845 
Luxembourg 120 : : 
Hungary 8495 3600 4805 
Malta 700 950 845 
Netherlands 19300 22575 23205 
Austria 11590 9860 11070 
Poland 5775 6845 58809 
Portugal 605 1990 2800 
Slovenia 8420 4270 3210 
Slovakia 2570 1070 1295 
Finland 1515 2225 2775 
Sweden 2180 6855 7355 
United Kingdom : 15100 21380 
Source: Eurostat, CIREFI data collection. 
These figures have been rounded.  
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Table 7: The number of return decisions  
 2002 2003 2004 Totals 
Austria 23.750 22.641 15.511 61.902 
Belgium 53.215 52.169 50.000 155.384 
Denmark 8.000 8.000 8.000 24.000 
Finland  3.526 3.456 3.800 10.782 
France 49.124 55.938 50.000 155.062 
Germany 143.000 143.000 143.000 429.000 
Greece 29.602 29.542 29.776 88.920 
Ireland  2.465 2.425 2.866 7.756 
Italy 94.995 70.147 70.320 235.462 
Luxemburg  1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
Netherlands  62.000 62.000 62.000 186.000 
Portugal  2.000 2.000 2.000 6.000 
Spain 56.130 69.773 66.419 192.322 
Sweden 18.497 22.656 27.876 69.029 
United Kingdom 70.000 70.000 70.000 210.000 
Cyprus 1.300 1.300 1.400 4.000 
Czech Republic 25.496 29.366 25.317 80.179 
Estonia 1.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
Hungary 7.233 7.878 6.911 22.022 
Latvia 362 709 286 1.357 
Lithuania 556 823 775 1.357 
Malta 1.949 970 1.319 4.238 
Poland 5.796 5.531 4.275 15.062 
Slovenia 6.256 3.917 3.110 13.283 
Slovak Republic  1.245 1.591 2.849 5.685 
EU-25 668.497.494 667.832 649.810 1.986.139 
Source: Member States. 
1. Where no data were provided by the Member States, the Commission has made estimates. Some data 
may have been amended to take into account other statistical information (for instance the number of 
persons receiving a negative asylum decision).   
2. To date no definition of a return decision exists in Community law. Data have been collected on the 
basis of existing information and data collections.   
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Table 8: Voluntary return and enforced return  
Voluntary Return Forced Return 
 
2002 2003 2004 Total 2002 2003 2004 Total 
 
Austria 785 1.023 1.162 2.970 11.592 11.171 9.943 32.706 
Belgium 3.321 2.814 3.286 9.421 11.727 11.262 8.497 31.486 
Denmark 2.530 2.014 2.130 6.674 390 408 244 1.042 
Finland  700 700 600 2000 1.623 1.910 1.853 5.386 
France 761 947 854 2.562 10.067 11.692 12.000 33.759 
Germany 11.774 11.646 9.961 33.381 29.036 26.487 21.614 77.137 
Greece  0 0 0 0 11.628 14.518 14.884 41.030 
Ireland  506 762 611 1.879  521 590 599 1.710 
Italy 2.641 8.126 7.678 18.445 25.226 19.729 17.200 62.155 
Luxemburg 190 610 325 1.125 44 98 56 198 
Netherlands 2.068 2.912 3.714 8.694 19.002 19.468 15.304 53.774 
Portugal 171 115 226 512 524 562 448 1.534 
Spain 798 604 992 2.394 26.434 27.788 27.600 81.822 
Sweden 6.756 8.815 10.196 25.767 1.592 2.258 2.601 5531 
United Kingdom  895 1.755 1.325 3.975 14.205 19.630 16.918 50.753 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 2.497 3.115 2.801 8.413 
Czech Republic 423 231 327 981 811 386 110 1.307 
Estonia  378 280 235 893 26 68 61 155 
Hungary 4.336 3.225 3.346 10.907 1.759 1.604 865 4.228 
Latvia 20 20 20 60 150 150 150 450 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 312 376 206 894 
Malta 1.254 931 704 2.889 223 200 200 623 
Poland 479 2 45 526 4.303 4.643 4.473 13.419 
Slovenia 1.856 608 461 2.925 2.840 3.114 2.246 8.200 
Slovak Republic  40 104 148 292 1205 1487 2701 5393 
 
EU-25 42.682 48.244 48.346 139.272 177.737 181.794 163.574 523.105 
Source: Member States 
Where no data were provided by the Member States, the Commission has made estimates. Some data may have 
been amended to take into account other statistical information (for instance the number of persons receiving a 
negative asylum decision).  
N.B. To date no definition of ‘voluntary return’ and ‘enforced return’ exists in Community law. Data have been 
collected on the basis of existing information and data collections.   
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III.  INTEGRATION  
Table 9: Reported resident population at 1 January 2003 and Eurostat estimates for 
selected citizenship groups (thousands)  
 BE CZ DK DE EE  EL ES FR IE IT CY LV  LT 
Total 
Population 10.355,8 10.203,3 5.383,5 82.536,7 1.356,0 11.006,4 41.550,6 59.635,0 3.963,6 57.321,1 715,1 2.331,5 3.462,6 
Nationals 9.503,9 10.076,4 5.118,1 75.656,5 1.084,5 10.239,2 39.951,5 56.314,0 3.682,7 55.978,6 647,9 2.230,3 3.428,3 
Other EU-25 
nationals 578,0 48,1 65,1 2085,9 4,0 79,5 392,1 1260,2 145,8 174,0 33,9 2,7 1,7 
Non-EU25 
nationals 274,0 78,8 200,3 4794,3 267,5 687,7 1207,0 2060,8 135,2 1168,5 33,3 98,5 32,5 
 BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT 
% Other EU  5,58% 0,47% 1,20% 2,52% 0,29% 0,72% 0,94% 2,11% 3,67% 0,30% 4,74% 0,11% 0,05% 
% NON EU 25 2,64% 0,77% 3,72% 5,80% 19,72% 6,25% 2,90% 3,45% 3,41% 2,04% 4,65% 4,22% 0,93% 
% Total 
foreign (EU + 
Non EU) 8,22% 1,24% 4,92% 8,32% 20,01% 6,97% 3,84% 5,56% 7,08% 2,34% 9,39% 4,33% 0,98% 
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 LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FIN SE UK TOTALS 
Total 
Population 448,3 10.142,4 397,3 16.192,6 8.082,0 38.218,5 10.407,5 1.995,0 5.379,2 5.206,3 8.940,8 59.328,9 454.559,9 
Nationals 282,8 10.049,6 389,7 15.492,6 7.366,7 37.518,4 10.173,6 1.955,1 5.276,1 5.102,6 8.466,7 56.592,7 432.578,5 
Other EU-
25 
nationals 143,6 17,3 4,9 222,9 164,2 14,4 50,4 1,5 11,8 32,8 206,9 1016,6 6758,3 
Non-EU25 
nationals 21,9 75,4 2,7 477,0 551,1 685,7 183,4 38,5 91,3 70,9 267,2 1719,6 15223,1 
 LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FIN SE UK 
     
AVERAGE 
% Other 
EU  32,03% 0,17% 1,23% 1,37% 2,03% 0,04% 0,48% 0,07% 0,22% 0,63% 2,31% 1,71% 2,60% 
% NON EU 
25 4,88% 0,74% 0,67% 2,95% 6,81% 1,79% 1,80% 1,92% 1,70% 1,36% 2,98% 2,89% 3,64% 
% Total 
foreign 
(EU + Non 
EU) 36,91% 0,91% 1,90% 4,32% 8,84% 1,83% 2,28% 1,99% 1,92% 1,99% 5,29% 4,60% 6,24% 
              
 
Source:  Eurostat.  The table also includes estimates established by Eurostat.  
Comments:  
1. Total reported population in 1.1.2003: Population totals provided by the countries, figures for France 
and Spain are provisional  
2. Figures for Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden are those provided by the countries, figures 
for other countries include some estimation by Eurostat  
3. The Non-EU nationals group for Estonia includes persons of "undetermined" citizenship.  The 2001 
Census recorded that 170.3 thousand of the "undetermined" were long-term residents of Estonia, that is 
they were citizens of the former USSR. 
4. The Nationals group for Latvia includes "Latvian non-citizens". This group numbered 504.0 thousand 
persons at the time of the 2000 Census. 
5. The Non-EU nationals group for Poland includes "Others not stated". This group numbered 666.6 
thousand persons at the time of the 2002 Census 
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IV.  ASYLUM  
Table 10: total number of first applications for asylum 
  2000 2001  2002  
Austria 30.127 39.354 32.359 
Belgium 24.507 18.798 16.940 
Cyprus 1.620 950 4.393 
Czech Republic 18.095 8.483 11.285 
Estonia 12 9 14 
Finland 1.651 3.443 3.220 
France 47.291 51.087 51.939 
Germany 88.287 71.127 50.563 
Greece 5.499 5.664 8.178 
Hungary 9.554 6.412 2.401 
Ireland 10.324 11.634 7.901 
Italy 17.400 16.015 13.705 
Latvia 14 24 5 
Lithuania 425 367 395 
Luxembourg 683 1.042 1.549 
Malta 153 474 457 
Netherlands 29.213 16.081 9.772 
Poland 4.528 5.169 6.825 
Portugal 234 245 116 
Slovak Republic 8.151 9.739 10.358 
Slovenia 1.520 673 1.119 
Spain 9.490 6.309 5.918 
Sweden 23.515 33.016 31.355 
U.K. 71.366 85.866 60.047 
 
EU 25 (except DK) 254.806 233.367 203.298 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table 11:- total number of positive decisions on asylum applications (refugee status, 
subsidiary protection) 
Refugee status Subsidiary protection 
  2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
Austria 1.152 1.073 2.084 248 898 0 
Belgium 1.167 1.166 0 219 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 57 86 146 31 32 76 
Estonia 0 0 0 7 1 0 
Finland 4 14 7 809 577 487 
France 5.049 6.326 6.341 0 0 0 
Germany 22.719 6.509 3.136 3.383 1.598 1.567 
Greece 147 36 4 233 111 36 
Hungary 174 104 178 783 1.304 772 
Ireland 458 893 345 166 140 0 
Italy 2.072 1.255 725 515 2.048 2.176 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Lithuania 3 1 3 192 220 485 
Luxembourg 68 44 62 184 35 149 
Malta 0 0 34 0 0 226 
Netherlands 1.156 777 1.104 4.759 6.560 4.769 
Poland 282 253 219 0 0 24 
Portugal 7 14 2 34 18 12 
Slovak Republic 18 20 11 0 0 0 
Slovenia 1 1 18 26 1 22 
Spain 314 186 238 260 143 167 
Sweden 166 261 430 4.519 5.241 3.892 
U.K. 11.179 8.100 5.379 19.845 19.965 7.804 
 
EU 25 (except DK) 33.002 17.463 12.969 6.586 6.929 5.604 
Source: Eurostat  
